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COMMENT
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION:
THE POLICY OF DISSIMULATION*
We sit for a while in the kitchen -
The white sweet smell of kerosene.
Sharp knife and a loaf of bread.
If you like, let the primus burn out,
And if not, gather string
To tie the basket before dawn,
Because we leave for the station
Where no one must find us out.
-Osip Mandelshtain (18 91-ca. 1938)
The author of this poem lived and died during the Stalinist terror, 1 but
the fear of totalitarianism that is expressed continues to characterize the ex-
perience of many individuals in the Soviet Union today. Although the Soviet
legal system in the past two decades has been modified to curb the excesses
of the Stalinist era, violations of human rights persist. One measure of in-
creased protection has been acceptance by the Soviet government of interna-
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, DePaul
University College of Law, for his suggestions and advice in the preparation of this Comment.
1. This period encompassed the 1930's and postwar years. From 1932-1933, six to seven
million people died in an artificially created famine, more than one million were shot, and more
than ten million died in concentration camps. Most victims were accused of counterrevolution-
ary crimes. Moreover, from 1934 on large numbers of people were tried and summarily exe-
cuted without right of appeal by three-man tribunals. Many others were sent to concentration
camps simply for being relatives of "enemies of the people." Beginning in 1938, torture could
be performed legally by state officials. These actions, which virtually extinguished human rights
in the Soviet Union, represented a sharp reversal of a previous trend toward greater individual
rights. The Bolsheviks justified these harsh conditions as necessary to the creation of the Soviet
state as a bulwark for an ideology destined to tranform human nature throughout the world. This
vision also formed the basis for the sweeping redistribution of political, legal, economic, and
social power in the hands of the state. Reddaway, Theory and Practice of Human Rights in the
Soviet Union, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 115, 118 (Kommers &
Loescher eds. 1979). For a fictional account-of imprisonment during the Stalinist era, see A.
SOLZHENITSYN, THE FIRST CIRCLE (1974). See also Weisberg, Solzhenitsyn's View of Soviet
Life in The First Circle, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1976).
Following Stalin's death in 1953, the national reign of terror abated so that by 1958 the Soviet
criminal codes reflected an attitude of greater respect for procedural due process in criminal
trials. This evolution is attributable to increasing Soviet political stability. Acts of treason and
crimes against the state were greatly reduced, due in part to the physical liquidation of counter-
revolutionary elements, and in part to the U.S.S.R.'s acquisition of sufficient military strength
to resist external aggression. Further, the economy was increasingly industrialized and agricul-
ture increasingly collectivized. Osakwe, Due Process of Law Under Contemporary Soviet Crim-
inal Procedure, 50 TUL. L. REv. 266, 269-70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Osakwe, Due Process].
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tional human rights obligations, which through domestic law it is committed
to implement. This commitment is demonstrated by various statutory
enactments and provisions of the Constitution of 1977.2 These recent obli-
gations are interpreted, however, within a framework of state policy as
promulgated by two overlapping entities-the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Supreme Soviet, the highest organ of state
authority, 3 which is dominated by the Party. 4  Moreover, both the Party
and the government officially regard the U.S.S.R. as still evolving within the
period of socialist revolution. 5  Consequently, human rights have not been
guaranteed to persons and groups deemed inimical to the policies and com-
prehensive plan 6 of the State and to the ultimate attainment of Corn-
2. CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Ninth Convo-
cation, on Oct. 7, 1977 [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTION].
3. The Constitution declares the Supreme Soviet to be the "highest body of state authority
of the U.S.S.R." Id. art. 108.
4. See J. HOUGH & M. FAINSOD, HOW THE SOVIET UNION Is GOVERNED 362-63 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as HOUGH]. The overlap between "party" and "government" occurs because
"[t]he vast majority of party members work full-time for some governmental ministry, and the
leading officials of the governmental agencies are members not only of the party but of the
leading party organs as well." Id. at 362.
5. The Soviet leadership officially states that the revolution is not yet complete and, there-
fore, contemporary Soviet society is at an imperfect although necessary stage in the construction
of Communism. The function of law at this stage is primarily to guide society toward this goal.
R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 162-63 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as DAVID]. See note 6 infra. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, the early stages
in the development of society are marked by class antagonism in which the ruling class controls
the tools of production and creates both the state and its law in order to perpetuate its domina-
tion over the exploited classes. Law is thus an instrument in the hands of exploiters and is used
to maintain social and economic inequality. Human history, it is argued, is the record of the
struggle by one class against another to wrest control of the tools of production. Id. at 158-60.
As presented by one Soviet commentator, the Marxist-Leninist analysis makes it possible to
predict a society in which this struggle ceases and law becomes altogether unnecessary. V.
CHKNIKVADZE, THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND LEGALITY IN THE U.S.S.R. 74 (1972). For this to
occur, the tools of production must become the property of the collectivity, which is a class
alliance between the proletariat (the vanguard of working people) and various strata of non-
proletarian working people. The aim of this alliance is the complete overthrow of capital and the
development of the institution of Socialism. Id. Only then, it is believed, will exploitation and
class antagonism disappear, and in its place, a fraternal, communist society ultimately emerge.
J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 425-26 (1964) [hereinafter cited as HAZARD, COM-
MUNISTS]. See DAVID, supra, at 160-61. Until the advent of global Communism, the theory
maintains, certain countries must emerge as "dictatorships of the proletariat," i.e., states in
which the ruling class of proletarian workers keeps the class enemy, the former exploiters,
under control. Feldbrugge, The Study of Soviet Law, 4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 201, 204 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Feldbrugge, Study]. The socialist conception of law as an instrument of
social evolution is conveniently suited to this situation. Indeed, the justification of the power
monopoly within the U.S.S.R. (the CPSU) and other socialist states rests upon the proposition
that as "purposeful agents" of the proletariat they have assumed the role as the leading force in
the struggle to attain Communism. Id. at 208.
6. All enterprises in the Soviet Union exist in principle to execute the centralized plan for
national economic development. They must achieve the goals imposed upon them by the plans
820
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munism. From the standpoint of Western legal consciousness, the State's
disregard for the rights of these individuals and groups not only conflicts
with the human rights prescriptions embodied in the major international in-
struments ratified by the Soviet Union, but also are inconsistent with the
Socialist functions of the Soviet legal systei. 7
This Comment analyzes the human rights practices of the U.S.S.R. from
the perspectives of international law and Soviet law. It ascertains the specific
content of the Soviet Union's human rights obligations as evidenced by the
sources of international law, and it evaluates the extent to which Soviet law
and practice has or has not met these obligations. 8 As will be shown, the
and are not permitted to act beyond statutory and state-imposed limitations. DAVID, supra note
5, at 215-16. Since the Party dominates the Soviet government, the plan is to a great extent
affected by changing policy decisions within the Party and by the ultimate authority of top Party
organs. See HOUGH, supra note 4, at 362. This interrelationship of Party and government is the
key device by which the CPSU maintains control over the legal and political systems of the
U.S.S.R. Vanneman, The Hierarchy of Laws in the Communist Party-State System in the Soviet
Union, 8 INT'L LAw. 285, 289-90 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Vanneman]. The philosophical
justification for the all-pervasive influence of the CPSU perhaps lies with the Marxist-Leninist
principle that the Party serves as the guardian of immutable truth both within itself and for the
people. Therefore, the Party presumes that it is entitled to exercise its prerogative not only
over the plan for economic development but in all matters affecting Soviet life, because its
members possess superior consciousness of the necessities imposed by nature for man's survival.
Codevilla, Marxist-Leninism and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 215, 217 (1978).
But see Lock, The Legal Metaphor in Marxism-Leninism, 4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 229 (1978)
(arguing that a coherent doctrine of Marxism-Leninism does not exist in reality and can only be
understood as an eclectic combination of elements of diverse origin).
7. The functions of socialist legality are encompassed within four categories. The first is
that law provides an organizational framework for society and thereby appoints, defines, and
fixes legal relationships. Felbrugge, Study, supra note 5, at 205. The second function of law is
to provide solutions to conflicts by prescribing the application of legal rules in certain situations.
Id. at 206. Law also serves an educative function; it points to the delinquent nature of behavior
that capitalist societies comprehend as normal. Thus, law is an instrument for the transformation
of society in accordance with the ideals of Communism. DAVID, supra note 5, at 163. A final
acknowledged goal of Soviet criminal law is that of combatting crime through the use of
punishment. It is also emphasized, however, that this should be replaced by the education and
resocialization of the wrongdoer. While punishment effectively deters crime, it is viewed as
exerting adverse effects on the convict and his family. Kelina, Substantive Criminal Late in THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE U.S.S.R. 130, 161-62 (M. Bassiouni & V. Savitski eds.
1979) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI & SAVITSri]. This formalization of legal objectives should
not obscure the fact that in a socialist society law cannot be dissociated from Marxist-Leninist
doctrines, for these doctrines serve as the philosophical and moral guideposts for the political
and lay communities. The resolution of any legal dispute should in theory be consistent with
this morality. DAVID, supra note 5, at 164. Indeed, the CPSU enacted a code of communist
morality as part of its program in 1961. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS, supra note 5, at 11.
8. See, e.g., Feldbrugge, Study, supra note 5, at 213. The author argues that claims by the
Soviet system of advances in the protection of human rights can be judged through a detailed
examination of provisions in Soviet law which correspond to its international obligations. Id. For
a discussion of the Soviet Union's implementation of human rights obligations prior to adoption
of the 1977 Constitution, see Uibopuu, The International Legal Obligations of the U.S.S.R. for
the Protection of Individuals, 14 CO-EXISTENCE 264 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Uibopuu, Indi-
viduals].
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Soviet legal system fails to implement its international obligations with re-
spect to the treatment of Jews, other ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities, aliens, and political dissidents. Finally, this Comment considers
responses available to the world community to induce the Soviet Union to
comply with its human rights commitments.
SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The salient inquiry in international law no longer is whether human rights
exist, 9 but whether there are rules of international law with specific legal
content that may be deemed binding on the states. 10 To this end, the
position of the Soviet Union with respect to international law must be tin-
derstood. Of the primary sources of international law-conventional law
(treaties and conventions), customary law, and general principles "-the
9. For articles which discuss the development of positive human rights norms under inter-
national law, see Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About The Individual in International Law, 24
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Higgins, Conceptual]; Humphrey, The
Implementation of International Human Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 31 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Humphrey]; Robertson, Human Rights: A Global Assessment, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Robertson, Global]; van Dijk, International Law and the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1529 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as van Dijk].
10. Henkin, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 6 COLUM. U. PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GENERAL EDUCATION SEMINAR 5, 6-7 (1977). The primary responsibility for the protection of
human rights is imposed upon the states for implementation through domestic law. Acceptance
of this indirect enforcement scheme has led some governments to assert that direct international
implementation is unnecessary and constitutes interference with national sovereignty. Hum-
phrey, supra note 9, at 34-35.
11. General principles constitute a subsidiary source of international law. These are drawn
from the legal systems of nations and are indicative of a legal policy which is recognized as
binding even though not formally codified. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62-63 (6th ed.
1963) [hereinafter cited as BRIERLY]. The crucial element in determining the existence of a
general principle is its presence in most, it not all, national legal systems. General principles are
subordinate, however, to both conventional and customary law as sources of international law.
Id. See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 1 3.
Certain general principles are so fundamental as to be essential to the formation of any legal
system whether or not they are expressly provided for in its laws. Some of these principles
include the right to life, freedom of the person, freedom of thought and religion, and the
principle of the rule of law. van Dijk, supra note 9, at 1544-45. A second major category
comprises principles of national and international law that are applied by analogy to situations in
which international law provides no specific rule. Id. at 1546. For a discussion of the role of
international conventions (especially the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
discussed at notes 26-30 and accompanying text infra) in codifying certain general principles of
the world's legal systems and therefore binding states which have not ratified these instruments,
see Havener & Mosher, General Principles of Laic and the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, 27 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 596 (1978).
1980] HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
U.S.S.R. recognizes only the first two as binding. 12 These sources evidence
that the Soviet Union has adopted positive human rights obligations. 13
12. The Soviet Union does not recognize general principles as a valid source of international
law, and, therefore, it is not bound by them. Soviet rejection of general principles simply
underscores its resistance to any attempts by other states to intervene in its internal affairs and
reflects a highly positivistic approach to international as well as domestic lawmaking. Thus, as a
commentator points out, the Soviet Union is unlikely to recognize human rights obligations as
binding unless they also are recognized under Soviet law. Uibopuu, Individuals, supra note 8,
at 274.
The Soviet Union relies primarily on article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, discussed at notes 16-19
and accompanying text infra, to argue that other states may not interfere in matters which it
deems to be entrusted to its national sovereignty. It finds additional support from the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, August 1, 1975, Principle VI, Nonin-
tervention in internal affairs, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEG. MATS. 1292, 1294-95 [hereinafter cited
as Helsinki Final Act], which provides that participating states refrain from intervention in the
domestic affairs of the co-signatories. Additionally, a Soviet commentator has stated that al-
though principles embodied in the world's legal systems may ultimately find expression in in-
ternational law, national law is not a direct source of international law; it only reflects interna-
tional rules and principles. Blishchenko, International Treaties and Their Application on the
Territory of the U.S.S.R., 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 825-26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Blishchenko].
See Robertson, The Helsinki Agreement and Human Rights, 53 NOTRE DAME LAw. 34, 40-41
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Robertson, Helsinki].
Recognition of general principles arguably would diminish Soviet sovereignty over its internal
affairs, for general principles impose binding obligations regardless of the state's manifestation of
assent to a particular rule. See note 11 supra. By accepting its obligations to respect human
rights under conventional and customary international law and to fulfill these obligations
through domestic legislation, however, the Soviet Union has tacitly modified its position on
absolute sovereignty to the extent of its committment to co-signatories to protect human rights
within its territory. Further, while Soviet assent initially may have been a precondition to the
creation of these obligations, it typically cannot be withdrawn once the instruments have en-
tered into force. See Robertson, Helsinki, supra, at 42. Compare the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 12, (providing for
denunciation by official notification from a state to the Secretary-General of the United Nations)
with the U.N. Covenants, notes 26 & 27 infra (containing no such provision for denunciation).
Moreover, an), attempt to denounce the U.N. Covenants is likely to be a nullity because accept-
ance of them as conventional law has been so extensive that all states are bound regardless of
assent. See notes 14 & 18 infra. See also Human Rights International Instruments: Signatures,
Ratifications, Accessions, etc., ST/HR/4, January 1, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Signatures].
13. Soviet jurists recognize the universally binding force of international law as providing a
means to regulate the general nature of international relationships among the states. See CON-
STITUTION, supra note 2, art. 29. This article states that "[t]he U.S.S.R.'s relations with other
states are based on . . . fulfillment in good faith of obligations arising from the generally recog-
nized principles and rules of international law, and from the international treaties signed by the
U.S.S.R." Id. One of the basic rules of Soviet international law is peaceful coexistence, which is
recognized as the best means of promoting world order amid the diversity of national economic
and legal systems. Vamvoukos, Chinese and Soviet Attitudes toward International Law: A Coin-
posite Approach, 5 REV. SOCIALIST L. 131, 136-37 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Vamvoukos]. See
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. 29. See also Tunkin, The Contemporary Soviet Theory of
International Law, [1978] 31 CURRENT LEG. PROBS. 177, 185 [hereinafter cited as Tunkin]. The
author notes that the Soviets recognize present day international law as "a law of international
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Treaties and Conventions
Treaties and conventions 14 are the paramount source of binding interna-
tional law recognized by the Soviet Union. 15 Preeminent among such
documents is the United Nations Charter. Although the Charter neither de-
fines nor catalogues human rights, several provisions impose express obliga-
tions on member states. 16 Specifically, articles 1 and 55 require that the
states respect human rights, and article 56 declares that article 55 is bind-
ing. 17
The Soviet Union, as a signatory to the Charter, is bound to adhere to its
principles and norms. This conclusion is consistent with the Soviet view that
cooperation." 1d. As distinct from its relations with non-socialist states, however, the Soviet
Union regards the operation of international law among socialist states as governed by principles
of international socialism, which functions independently of the principle of peaceful coexis-
tence. CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. 30; Vamvoukos, supra, at 136-37.
14. Although no fixed meaning can be ascribed to these terms, a treaty suggests a more
formal kind of arrangement, while a convention suggests an arrangement that is generally, but
not always, less formal or less significant. BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 317. A treaty is a means
for two or more states to enter into an agreement for a special object, imposing binding obliga-
tions only as between the immediate parties. Id. at 57. The primary purpose of a treaty quite
often is to create an obligation which otherwise would not have existed or to exclude the appli-
cation of a preexisting rule. Id. Treaties are thus a source of international law for the sig-
natories, but ordinarily treaties cannot be regarded as creating new law. Id. at 58.
Conventions, by contrast, are a legislative class of treaties; that is, they may be regarded as a
source of general law to which a substantial number of states have consented. In consenting,
these states seek to declare what they believe the law to be in a certain area, to prescribe
general rules for future conduct, or to establish international institutions. Id. The nature of
conventions as positive law further implies that in particular circumstances they can create obli-
gations binding on all states with or without their assent. Id. at 326.
15. Erickson, Soviet Theory of the Legal Nature of Customary International Law, 7 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 148, 149 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Erickson]. See also Hazard, Soviet
Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9, 19 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Hazard, Tactics].
16. Humphrey, supra note 9, at 35.
17. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 provides in relevant part:
The Purposes of the United Nations are ...
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and en-
couraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; ....
U.N. Charter art. 55 provides in relevant part:
With a view of creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are neces-
sary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the prin-
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
U.N. Charter art. 56 provides in relevant part:
All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
[Vol. 29:819
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a state party to a convention is bound because that state has explicitly man-
ifested its assent. 18 The Charter lacks sufficient specificity applicable to par-
ticular situations, however, and thus it imposes only a general obligation on
the Soviet Union. 19 Despite its general language, the U.N. Charter has
provided a foundation for the establishment of specific human rights norms
in subsequent documents.
The law of internationally protected human rights in time of peace 20
began to acquire substance with the Genocide Convention. 21 That docu-
ment defines genocide as various acts committed with intent to destroy in
whole or in part any national, ethnical, racial or religious group 2 2 and de-
clared such acts to be international crimes. 23 While the Genocide Conven-
tion has been ratified by the great majority of states, it has drawn sharp
criticism from commentators. 24 The instrument protects civilian populations
18. Erickson, supra note 15, at 164-65, In addition, Soviet scholars believe that the Charter
provisions, taken as a whole, are so basic to interstate relations that the Charter acquires a
special status which is binding on non-signatories as a source of customary international law. Id.
According to these scholars, the principles of the Charter are so firmly fixed in the morality of
the world community that no two non-signatory states may agree to the contrary. Hazard, Tac-
tics, supra note 15, at 23.
19. Although articles 2, 5, 6, and 94 of the Charter provide for various means for the inter-
national implementation of obligations, none of these provisions has ever been invoked success-
fully against the Soviet Union. The United Nations has had recourse, however, to implementa-
tion measures in the broader sense of bringing pressure to bear on nations by means of public
discussion and by adoption of resolutions, particularly in the General Assembly. While these
actions are not legally binding, their effect is felt through influence on public opinion, and they'
deter conduct as effectively as a legal sanction. Humphrey, supra note 9, at 35-36.
20. Human rights are also protected within the context of the humanitarian law of war. The
four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 establish the basic foundation for a humanitarian
law of armed conflict. 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287. The aim of these Conventions is to protect
noncombatant military personnel and civilians who do not participate in hostilities, van Dijk,
supra note 9, at 1536-37. Further protection would be provided by the two Protocols additional
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and
II to the Geneva conventions, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEG. MATS. 1391 (1977). Both the Conven-
tions and the Protocols shift legal emphasis from military necessity to humanitarian considera-
tions, and thus the safety and security of the individual are protected in the context of war. See
generally J. PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS (1975).
21. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention].
22. Id. art. II, at 280.
23. Id. art. I.
24. Despite ratification of the Convention by many states, genocide is still committed.
Lopez-Rey, Crime and Human Rights, 42 FED. PROB. 10, 12 (1978). Perhaps the most serious
weakness in the Genocide Convention is its inadequate definition of protected group. Article II
applies this term to genocidal acts committed against national, ethnical, racial or religious
groups. No protection, however, is offered, to political, social, economic, cultural, or any other
human group as such. Moreover, the Convention fails to recognize that genocide primarily is
directed against the individual members of specific groups and thus violates individual human
rights as well as those of minorities or groups. Consequently, it has been suggested that the
definition of genocide be more expansive so as to encompass the deliberate physical destruction
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from certain excesses of their own governments in times of war and peace,
but because it does not expressly protect individuals against human rights
violations; it is too narrow in scope. Thus, the Convention imposes binding
obligations on the Soviet Union as a signatory not to commit genocidal acts
against protected groups within Soyiet territory, but it does not apply to any
of the numerous reported cases of government acts committed against indi-
viduals. 25
Two major United Nations conventions subsequently have begun to fill
the void surrounding the need to protect individual human rights. These are
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 26 and the Interna-
tioial Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 27 Read together,
these conventions define a wide array of human rights norms that heretofore
had not risen to the level of conventional law. Some of the major provisions
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are as follows:
1. The right of all people to self-determination 28 is guaranteed
(art. 1).
of any member of a human group by reason of his or her membership in a protected group. 2
P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 119-36 (1959).
25. One commentator has summarized his criticism of the Genocide Convention by stating
that it is "telling evidence of the unwillingness of the members of the United Nations to divest
themselves of their monopoly of responsiblity for their nationals or more realistically, to become
internationally accountable to them." G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 64 (6th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARZENBERGER].
26. Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
27. Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. CAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N.
Doe. A/6316 (1966). The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights will hereinafter be referred to together as the U.N. Covenants. The
Soviet Union is a signatory to the Covenants. Signatures, supra note 12.
28. Broadly defined, self-determination is the direction that a people takes in establishing a
system of internal public order, regardless of the form or the internal policies that are pursued.
Novogrod, Civil Strife and Indirect Aggression, in I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw 198, 209 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Novogrod]. The legal
right, as opposed to the political right, to self-determination under international law applies only
to a restricted category of cases. The term itself has two distinct meanings. In the first sense, it
refers to the sovereign equality among existing states, and in particular to the right of a state to
choose freely its own form of government. In the second sense, it refers to the right of a specific
territory or "people" to choose its own form of government without intervention by the larger
state of which it is a part. Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, [1976-
19771 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 93, 152 [hereinafter cited as Crawford]. See U.N. Charter, art. 1,
para. 5 and art. 55 (recognizing the right of self-determination in the first sense), and arts. 73(b)
and 76(b) (implicitly recognizing it in the second sense). Although self-determination cannot be
deemed an operative right on the basis of the Charter, it has nonetheless been given substance
by U.N. practice, especially through affirmation in many General Assembly resolutions. Novo-
grod, supra, at 210.
Additionally, under customary international law, there has been sufficient state practice car-
ried out with the belief that such activity is obligatory so as to establish a legal principle of
self-determination, Crawford, supra, at 157. Among the features of this principle that have
evolved as a result of current practice is that the right to self-determination attaches only after
the appropriate "unit" of self-det(rimination has been ascertained. One such unit can be charac-
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2. Arbitrary deprivation of life is prohibited (art. 6).
3. Torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment is absolutely forbidden (art. 7).
4. Slavery and forced labor are likewise forbidden (art. 8).
5. Arbitrary arrest and detention are also prohibited (art. 9).
6. Equal treatment of persons before courts of law is guaranteed
(art. 14).
7. Retrospective penal legislation (both as to offenses and
punishments) is prohibited (art. 15).
8. Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion (art. 18).
9. Freedom of speech is also guaranteed (art. 19(2)).
10. Freedom of assembly and freedom of association are likewise
protected (arts. 21 and 22).
11. Racial discrimination is forbidden (art. 4(2)).
12. Everyone is guaranteed the.freedom to leave any country, in-
cluding one's own (art. 12(4)). 29
13. The right of all people to the free disposition of their natural
wealth and resources is also protected (art. 1(2)).
14. Everyone also has the right to take part in public affairs either
directly or through freely chosen representatives (art. 25).
15. Everyone accused of a crime is entitled to protection under
certain minimum standards, such as the rights to prepare a de-
fense, to choose counsel and to present witnesses on one's behalf
(art. 14(3)).
In addition to these provisions, the Covenant declares that in no case does
the existence of a national emergency justify the suspension of the right to
life, nor does it permit the use of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. Moreover, a national emergency is not grounds
for illegally declaring someone to be guilty of a criminal offense, nor does it
justify suspension of the right to recognition everywhere as an individual
before the law. 30
terized as a territory forming a distinct political-geographical area whose inhabitants do not
participate in the government either of the region or the state of which the territory is part,
with the result that this territory is non-self-governing. Id. at 160. The recognition of such a
unit leads to the conclusion that the right of self-determination should not be so narrowly con-
fined as to include only colonial peoples. It is also at stake in many of the Union Republics of
the U.S.S.R. See Novogrod, supra, at 210. See also notes 128-32 and accompanying text infra.
29. Cf. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter cited as Refugee Convention] (to which the Soviet Union is a signatory). Article 26
obligates each contracting party to accord to refugees lawfully within its territory the right to
choose their place of residence and to move freely within that territory, subject to the regula-
tions that the state normally imposes on aliens. For documentation of Soviet ratification of this
and other Conventions, see Signatures supra note 12.
30. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27, art. 4. Derogations allow for the
suspension or breach of certain treaty obligations in time of war or public emergency. Id.
Another related concept' is the "clawback" clause which also may be embodied in a treaty. This
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The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees first
that the principle of self-determination is a legal right and not merely an
impolitic and unjustified promise incapable of fulfillment (article 1). Sec-
ondly, Group Rights emphasize other principles of self-determination, such
as the right of a people to dispose freely of its natural resources and the
unlawfulness of depriving a people of its means of subsistence (article 1). The
Covenant also contains a nondiscrimination clause and makes specific provi-
sion for the equal rights of men and women (article 3). Among the other
rights guaranteed are the right to work (article 6), just and favorable working
conditions (article 7), protection of family rights (article 10), the right to edu-
cation (articles 13 and 14), and the right of all people to take part in cultural
life (article 15).
The Soviet Union also has ratified the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 31 From the standpoint
of Soviet law, the most significant human rights provision of this Convention
is article 5, which forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, or na-
tional or ethnic origin, as to enjoyment of the right to leave any country,
including one's own, and to return to one's country.
It is clear that the Soviet Union is committed to a wide range of interna-
tional obligations in the field of human rights both with respect to individu-
als and groups. The fact that these obligations are solemn and unambiguous
is attested to by the position of the U.S.S.R. concerning the legally binding
nature of conventions in international lawmaking. Through its interpretation
of conventional law, the Soviet Union recognizes as legally binding only
those norms to which it has assented. It thereby asserts that international
law promulgated by the West imposes no obligations unless the U.S.S.R.
explicitly has agreed to be bound. This approach to international lawmaking
also enables the Soviet Union to shape the development of international law
and to gain the sustained impetus for new principles it deems essential to its
clause permits the breach of an obligation in normal circumstances for specific reasons such as
the preservation of national security, or the demands of democracy or public order. Higgins,
Conceptual, supra note 9, at 28. Derogation, by contrast, is permitted in conditions of national
emergency of such magnitude as to threaten the survival of the nation. While such a provision
may be necessary to accommodate the needs of a state in performing its public duties for the
common good, it is undesirable for a state to exercise this right where no reasonable need of the
state could be served by suspension of basic human rights. See Higgins, Derogations Under
Human Rights Treaties, [1976-1977] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 282, 289 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Higgins, Derogations]. Although it is doubtful in such cases whether the common good
would be served, derogation and clawback clauses, as well as the issues of individual right of
petition and the jursidiction of the court, pose serious obstacles to persons seeking to assert
human rights claims. Higgins, Conceptual, supra note 9, at 28-29. See note 33 and accompany-
ing text infra. Cf. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, [1950] Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 15 [hereinafter cited as Euro-
pean Convention] (providing that in time of public emergency, suspension of certain formalities
may be justified, but the abolition, even temporarily, of human rights is forbidden).
31. March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter cited as Racism Convention]. See Signa-
tures, supra note 12.
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policies and ideology. 32 Although the Soviet Union is unwilling to accept
the current trends in human rights law promoted by Western nations (par-
ticularly the right of individual petition before an internationally constituted
judicial body), 33 it presses for adoption of human rights where support
32. Thus, Soviet conventional law both reflects and is an intrinsic component of Soviet
foreign policy. J. TmsKA & R. SLUSSER, THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES
175-79 (1962) [hereinafter cited as TRISKA]. Recognition of conventional law as the primary
source and prima facie basis for international relations has gradually gained acceptance outside
the Soviet bloc. The U.S.S.R. is now in a position to advance its own principles of conventional
law and thereby to shape its content. Id. at 25-26. Moreover, in the event of a conflict between
an international treaty and Soviet federal legislation, with the exception of the Constitutions of
the Union and Union Republics, the rule of the treaty assumes priority. This doctrine of treaty
preeminence is further evidence of the importance of treaties and conventions to the Soviet
Union. K. GRYZBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as GRYZBOWSKI, SOVIET].
33. Uibopuu, Individuals, supra note 8, at 268. Its justification for this practice is that
protection of human rights is exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. Id.
Codification of the law of human rights has produced diverse mechanisms for implementation,
yet enforcement of human rights has been largely unfulfilled. One such mechanism, the Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 30, is regarded by some commentators as the most effective sys-
tem yet created for the protection of human rights. Its great merit is that the individual is
granted access to an international organ which can investigate the complaint, provided that the
state concerned has subscribed to the "right of individual petition" and the individual has
exhausted local remedies. Id. arts. 19, 25. See Humphrey, supra note 9, at 48-49; Robertson,
Global, supra note 9, at 23-24. See generally A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE
(1977). At the international level, implementation is achieved primarily by two organs: the
European Commission of Human Rights, and a European Court of Human Rights. The Com-
mission is essentially a conciliatory body, but it also may state its opinion that disclosed facts
reveal a violation of human rights by a state party. Moreover, mere ratification of this Conven-
tion exposes a signatory to the possibility that another state party will accuse it of a breach
before the Commission. European Convention, supra note 30, art. 24. See Humphrey, supra
note 9, at 49.
In the western hemisphere, the leading human rights document is the American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1 Doc., 65, Rev.
1, Corr. 2 of Jan. 7, 1970. This Convention grants persons, groups, and non-governmental
organizations the right to lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights on behalf of others whose rights allegedly have been violated. Id. arts. 44, 45. States
which ratify the Convention are subject to disputes with other states only if they expressly
recognize the competence of the Commission to hear state applications. Humphrey, supra note
9, at 51-52.
Another mechanism is found in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26,
arts. 28-45, which provides for international implementation through creation of a Human
Rights Committee. The Committee's functions are to deal with reports from states-parties and
to consider complaints by one state that another has not fulfilled its obligations. This procedure
has been criticized as highly complicated and subject to long delays. In addition, neither the
Human Rights Committee nor a Conciliation Committee (created under art. 42), is empowered
to make judicial determinations. Id. See Humphrey, supra note 9, at 47.
Implementation of human rights also could be sought through the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), arts. 1, 2. A state-party to the Covenant
that is also a party to the Protocol recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee
to receive and consider complaints from individuals who claim to be victims of violations by that
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among Soviet-led and developing countries is forthcoming. Thus, the Soviet
Union is disinclined to receive conventional law formulated and adopted by
capitalist countries, but it is prepared to join with the new majority to form
a coalition now capable of making international law. 4
Finally, consideration must be given to the Helsinki Final Act of August
'1, 1975.3 5 That document, neither a treaty nor a convention, is a declara-
tion of intentions, and as such it does not require ratification by a legislative
body, and non-observance of its provisions does not constitute a breach of
any obligation recognized under international law. The Helsinki Final Act
imposes moral obligations on participating states to respect human rights,
and it directly involves them as a proper subject of international undertak-
ing. 36 The focus of the Act is upon greater international security and closer
relations between states with special recognition of the inviolability of par-
ticipants' frontiers as they existed at the end of World War II.37 Thus, the
Helsinki Final Act emphasizes the actions of states toward one another
rather than the circumstances or behavior of individuals. Human rights prin-
ciples are discussed, however, in Basket VII of the "Declaration of Princi-
ples guiding Relations between Participating States." These principles in-
state. The Committee is permitted to forward its recommendations, however, only to the state
and the individual. Id. arts. 1-5. The Optional Protocol has been attacked as providing only a
feeble enforcement mechanism and for failing to provide means whereby third parties may
bring complaints on behalf of individuals unable to petition on their own behalf. Humphrey,
supra note 9, at 45.
34. Hazard, Tactics, supra note 15, at 11, 27-28. Soviet policy in international law favors the
struggle against broad violation of human rights by states. Thus, the U.S.S.R. has singled out
practices such as aggression, fascism, colonialism, genocide, apartheid, racism, and slavery. It
has ratified a number of conventions which declare such practices to be international crimes.
E.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 21; Racism Convention, supra note 31; Refugee Con-
vention, supra note 29; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, July 18, 1976, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 GAOR (No. 50), U.N. Doc. A/9233/Add.
1 (1973); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institu-
tions and Practices Similar to Slavery, September 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3. See Signatures,
supra note 12. See also Tunkin, supra note 13, at 185-86. The Soviet Union's condemnation of
fascism is evidenced also by its signing of the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, followed
by the London Declaration of August 8, 1945, which established the International Military
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The U.S.S.R. also adopted Control Council Ordinance No.
10, December 20, 1945, which conferred jurisdiction upon the Allies to try lower level war
criminals within the Allies' post World War II zones of occupation. Bassiouni, An Appraisal of
the Growth and Developing Trends of International Criminal Law, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DE DROIT PENAL 405, 415-16 (1975).
35. See note 12 supra.
36. Robertson, Helsinki, supra note 12, at 34-35; Goldberg, Human Rights and the Belgrade
Meeting, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 250 (1978). By contrast, a fundamental principle of Soviet
international law is that treaty obligations must be strictly and unequivocally observed. TnISKA,
supra note 32, at 97-100. See generally BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 57-58, 325-26; Robertson,
Helsinki, supra note 12, at 35-36. Another commentator states that Soviet scholars usually clas-
sify individual human rights as socio-economic rights. Uibopuu, Individuals, supra note 8, at
274.
37. Helsinki Final Act, Principle IV, Territorial Integrity of States, supra note 12, at 1295.
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clude an agreement among the states to "respect" freedom of thought, con-
science and religion or belief, and to "promote and encourage" the exercise
of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights and freedoms. a In
addition, the principles concerning Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other
Fields are designed to promote freer movement of individuals by obliging
the signatories to expedite travel on the basis of family ties, reunification,
proposed marriages, and travel for personal and professional reasons. 39
The Helsinki Final Act is important despite its lack of treaty status be-
cause it can' be effective in ensuring greater regard for human rights by
means of its disseminatiQn in the U.S.S.R. Such publicity in turn would
encourage dissidents and public officials to resist abuses of human rights. 40
Helsinki also is important because it is a step toward formal recognition of
additional human rights obligations through treaty action. Western jurists,
arguing that human rights have taken treaty form, are demanding recogni-
tion of individual complaints under Helsinki. 41 Thus, while the Soviet ar-
gument that the human rights provisions of Helsinki do not rise to the level
of a treaty cannot be dismissed summarily, there is cause for optimism that
what began as a declaration of intentions may ultimately ripen into a formal
obligation. Despite its non-treaty status, the Helsinki Final Act strengthens
the mechanisms for protection of human rights.
Customary International Law
The secondary source of international law that the Soviet Union recognizes
as binding is customary international law. 42 This source is viewed as subor-
dinate to conventional law and is relied upon primarily to fill gaps in
treaties. 4 Although Soviet jurists are reluctant to receive customary law
from Western countries, as they had no share in its development, some
Soviet scholars have argued that new and advanced international norms have
emerged, particularly the right of national self-determination, peaceful
38. Id. at 1295.
39. Id. at 1313-14. See Ttrrack, Freedom of Transitional Movement: The Helsinki Accord
and Beyond, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 585, 586 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Turack].
40. Hazard, Tactics, supra note 15, at 40.
41. See Robertson, Helsinki, supra note 12, at 47.
42. Customary international law, as formulated by Western jurists, derives from a usage or
practice by the states which becomes accepted as obligatory. Thus, if a customary practice is
violated, it is believed that some sanction should be presented for the transgressor. BRIERLY,
supra note 11, at 59. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the international Court of Justice provides
that custom is "evidence that a general practice is accepted as law." Two requirements normally
must be met in order to determine that a given custom is legally binding. First, there is the
concrete requirement of repetitive action, sometimes called "usus." Second, there is a
psychological element whereby the action is repeated with the conviction that such conduct
fulfills a legal obligation or exercises a legal right, van Dijk, supra note 9, at 1541-43.
43. Erickson, supra note 15, at 150-51. See also Uibopuu, Individuals, supra note 8, at
285-87.
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coexistence, and disfavor of unequal treaties. 44 It has been argued further
that increased Soviet influence in international lawmaking will weaken the
"bourgeoise" character of customary law. 45 Consequently, Soviet jurists
have expressed interest in recognizing customary law that bears the imprint
of Soviet ideology. Prior to adopting a customary norm, however, these
jurists will determine whether requirements of time, repetition and con-
tinuity have been met, as well as the indispensable requirement of agree-
ment among the states. 46
The effect of the Soviet theory becomes apparent when these four criteria
are applied to international human rights instruments such as the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 47
According to the Soviet view, the Charter is binding on signatory and non-
signatory alike because of widespread ratification by the states. 48 The Char-
44. Erickson, supra note 15, at 151. But see Uibopuu, The International Legal Status of
Soviet Minorities Today, 2 REV. SOCIALIST L. 217, 218 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Uibopuu,
Minorities] (arguing that there has been scant development of customary law for the protection
of the human rights of Soviet minorities).
45. Erickson, supra note 15, at 151. At the inception of the Soviet State in 1917, the offi-
cially stated government policy was to rely solely on treaties as the source of its international
rights and duties; however, elements of customary law were implicit in the actions of the
U.S.S.R. from the beginning. As the government's position evolved, custom acquired greater
significance and is today second only to treaties as the primary source of Soviet international
law. Id. at 148-49. See generally TRISKA, supra note 32, at 10-23.
46. Erickson, supra note 15, at 151, 154-57. According to Soviet scholars, time refers to
duration of a practice. Repetition requires that the actions be reitereated through time, and
continuity means that the practice must not be interrupted. Id. at 154-56. Agreement among
the states first requires coordinated wills. In essence, this refers to a reciprocal recognition by
the states that a particular rule constitutes a norm of international law. Secondly, the states
must agree on the substantive content of the rule. These norms acquire the force of law when
the states manifest their intention to be bound. Id. at 158-59. See also Hazard, Tactics, supra
note 15, at 19-20; GRYZBOWSKI, SOVIET, supra note 32, at 409-11.
47. International Bill of Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights]. The Soviet Union has, however abstained from voting in favor of the
resolution, but this fact is not mentioned by most Soviet authors. Uibopuu, Individuals, supra
note 8, at 286.
48. Cf. The International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on The Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa),
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, which concluded un-
equivocally that the Charter imposes human rights obligations on member states and that these
are self-executing obligations which gain specific content from the Charter and other human
rights instruments. Id. at 57. For a comprehensive survey of the arguments that the U.N.
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Hunan Rights impose obligations on all states to
protect human rights regardless of assent, see Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and
the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (1972). Historically, however,
Soviet scholars viewed customary norms as binding only if a state had explicitly assented to be
bound. Accordingly, the U.S.S.R. was not bound by any customary law to which it had not
given prior agreement. See TRISKA, supra note 32, at 21. This approach was more expedient at
a time when the Soviet Union lacked the military and political power that it possesses today. By
contrast, one Western commentator adopts the view that only those states which have explicitly
rejected the content of a customary norm cannot be regarded as bound by it. van Dijk, supra
note 9, at 1543.
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ter thus becomes declaratory of customary international law on the subject of
human rights and imposes binding obligations on all nations.
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though not a
treaty, embodies human rights principles so widely accepted as to be declar-
atory of customary law and to provide a source for subsequent interpretation
of the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter. 49  By applying the
standards of Soviet scholars for acceptability of a customary practice, it is
clear that the Universal Declaration qualifies as customary law. It not only
has endured as a valid instrument for over three decades, but it also has
engendered other documents, such as the U.N. Covenants, which specify
substantially the same rights as the Declaration. 50 Further, the Declaration
has served as the basis for reiterated behavior among states, and there has
been no retreat from or other interruption of the practices that it espouses.
Most importantly, in formulating the Declaration, the world community
acted collectively within the framework of the United Nations General As-
sembly to express its opinion concerning international recognition of human
rights. This action is significant as reflecting the consensus position of the
states. 51 Consequently, many clauses of the Declaration (and arguably the
entire document) have come to be recognized as binding customary law
through both the general support received at the time of adoption and sub-
sequent United Nations practice. 52 In this manner, the Universal Declara-
tion conforms to the Soviet Union's rationale governing customary law and
should be regarded as binding.
49. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, U.N. Conference on the Law of
Treaties, Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, May 23, 1969, art. 31. This document provides that the conduct
of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of a treaty may be relied upon for interpretation of
present obligations. Thus, subsequent agreements and customary practices become sources of
interpretation of prior treaty provisions. Accordingly, the Universal Declaration should be re-
garded as a subsequent agreement which interprets article 55 of the Charter, as evidenced by
the preamble to the Declaration:
Whereas, the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person
and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 47. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
thus permits subsequent interpretation of article 55 of the U.N. Charter by means of the Uni-
versal Declaration. As a result, specific guarantees of the Declaration are incorporated into the
general human rights provisions of the Charter, and violation of these obligations constitutes a
breach of international law. See also Britain v. Albania (Corfu Channel Case), [1949] I.C.J. 25;
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.'s case, [1952] I.C.J. 93; Southwest Africa cases, [1966] I.C.J. 4. See gen-
erally A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 424-27 (1969); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 24, at
136-37; Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 657-71 (1953).
50. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra.
51. The Universal Declaration also is generally regarded as the authentic interpretation of
the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter. Humphrey, supra note 9, at 33.
52. Higgins, Conceptual, supra note 9, at 22; van Dijk, supra note 9, at 1543.
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It is reasonable to conclude that customary international law may impose
additional human rights obligations on the Soviet Union by filling gaps in
present treaties and by providing the doctrinal basis for future obligations.
Therefore, customary law, as a source of human rights principles, should be
relied upon to supplement and amplify conventional law, especially when
the binding nature of the duties imposed finds support within the Soviet
framework.
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER
SOVIET DOMESTIC LAW
Despite the Soviet Union's recognition of a wide range of human rights,
the implementation and enforcement of these rights is subject to a degree of
conflict with Party-influenced government policy. Consequently, certain
types of individuals and groups are denied protections when their interests
are regarded as incompatible with the policies and objectives of the CPSU,
at least to the extent that these policies are interpreted by administrative
and judicial functionaries. The actual risk posed by the individual or group
may, in reality, be relatively minor compared to the immensity of the State's
power to carry out its policies. The willingness and ability of the government
to crush what it regards as opposition not only reflects the pervasiveness of
its control, but also its belief that in order to maintain power it cannot per-
mit dissident or counterrevolutionary elements to create discord or to hinder
the State on the course that the Party, with its professed superior under-
standing, has charted.
Traditionally, Jews, certain ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,
aliens, and political dissidents have experienced the harshest treatment due
to the discerned threat that their behavior poses to state security. The Soviet
government asserts that it has acquired a special interest in the resolution of
these cases. Prosecution of offenses often would not be initiated at all if
"ordinary" persons were involved, nor would the punishments imposed be
as harsh. 53 Moreover, in many cases criminal charges against these indi-
viduals are explained in terms of the "degree of risk" presented to the State
and thus fail to conform to any definite legal criteria. In many other cases
the criminal charges are simply the result of official prejudice. Further,
political ideology or personal motivation are not necessarily germane to the
treatment of these victims. 54
53. See Dershowitz, Due Process of Law in the Trial of Soviet Jews, 4 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN
RIcHTS 253, 255 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz]. See also Shtromas, Crime, Law and
Penal Practice in the USSR, 3 REV. SOcIALIST L. 297, 300 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Shtromas] (arguing that although political and economic crimes are viewed as direct threats to
the survival of the Soviet system, general delinquency crimes represent no such threat and
should be regarded as normal social deviance).
54. See Forsythe, Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection, 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNATIONAL at 298-99 (1974). The author discusses the general phenomenon of political
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Soviet Jews
In many respects the Soviet legal system has undergone significant
changes since 1958. Substantive offenses are now defined with greater
specificity, and procedural safeguards exist at all stages in the criminal pro-
cess. 55 The Soviet system has retained; however, a variety of institu-
tionalized practices which violate the human rights of Soviet Jews, particu-
larly in the' areas of emigration, the internal passport system, and criminal
due process rights. Further, fundamentals of justice and fairness are
often disregarded in the areas of family law and labor law as the result of
emigration requests by Jews.
a. Emigration
One of the most widely reported abusive practices concerns the measures
devised by government officials to create nearly insurmountable obstacles for
Jews who apply for exit visas. Although a request to leave is not in theory a
violation of Soviet law, 56 Jews are harassed by administrative officials,
policemen, and private citizens motivated either by anti-Semitism, or by a
misguided spirit of Communism.57
The lack of a code of administrative procedure and the fact that certain
types of normative acts are unpublished, except for use by relevant au-
thorities, 58 have led to decisions not grounded in legality and even to arbit-
rary denials of permission to Jews to exit. Abuse of administrative discretion
also may result in retaliation affecting the applicant's family and employ-
prisoners and notes that many are detained under "'non-security laws" or "quasi-security
charges" which relate logically to the notion of security, rather than to the actual wording of any
law. Thus, the ideology or motivation of the individual might be disregarded by a government.
Beyond this, the concept of security risk is subject to excessive government manipulation, but,
by contrast, any violation of law may threaten government security if it is sufficiently wide-
spread. Id. Despite the imprecision of the term "political prisoner" and the broad categories of
individuals to whom it is applicable, the importance of balancing the Soviet Union's policies
with respect to these individuals against its human rights obligations is neither diminished nor
invalidated. The content of human rights norms remains specific and ascertainable even if the
subjects of these protections can only be loosely defined.
55. For works which analyze contemporary Soviet criminal law, see BASSlOUNI & SAVlTSKI,
supra note 7; Osakwe, Due Process, supra note 1; Osakwe, Contemporary Soviet Criminal Law:
An Analysis of the General Principles and Major Institutions of Post-1958 Soviet Crimnal Law,
6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 437 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Osakwe, Analysis].
56. Pettiti, The Administrative Practice, the Measures Taken and the Harassments Applied
Following the Requests for a Visa, 4 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 288, 291 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Pettitil.
57. One author reports cases of Jews who were attacked by anti-Semitic hooligans and, in
some cases, assaulted at police stations after they requested permission to leave. Id.
58. Lapenna, The Contemporary Crisis of Legality in the Soviet Union Substantive Criminal
Law, I REV. SOCIALIST L. 73, 86 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lapenna]; Loeber, Legal Rules for
"Internal Use Only," 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 70, 73, 79-80 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Loeber].
See also Vanneman, supra note 6, at 301.
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ment. 59 Penal law also may be invoked as a repressive measure, whereby
applicants may be prosecuted for the major offense of antipatriotic behavior
detrimental to the State. 60  Another tactic is to call up an applicant or his
son for military service. This device both serves as a deterrent to requests
and as a punitive action following refusal. 61 In addition to these barriers,
the government demands family concurrence in decisions to emigrate. This
concurrence will be difficult to obtain if one spouse is unwilling to leave, if
there has been a divorce, or if the applicant's parents are unwilling to
leave. 62 Finally, while the cost to an applicant to file for an exit visa is only
40 rubles, another 860 rubles is payable before departure, thus imposing a
financial burden equivalent to $1200.63
It is difficult to comprehend how these harsh and arbitrary measures pre-
serve state security. Indeed, quite often the wide range of discretion may
lead to administrative confusion, so that while officials distract themselves
with the innocent, the genuine security risk may escape. If it is necessary to
screen Jewish emigration applicants to ensure that state secrets do not exit
with them, an approach with clearly defined standards and procedures would
be more efficient. Leaving emigration decisions to the discretion of officials
is therefore counterproductive to the State's interests and loses sight of the
Marxist-Leninist principle that law is to be invoked in the service of the
State. 64
59. One such case is that of Aranovich, who applied for permission in 1972 to leave the
U.S.S.R. for the United States. Permission was granted to two members of his family but
denied to Aranovich himself on the grounds that he worked for a classified project. The appli-
cant claimed that he had not worked on any such project for a long period of time and that the
questions he had dealt with were discussed in public literature. The authorities responded by
insuring that Aranovich lost his job, disconnecting his telephone, and evicting him from his
apartment. Permission was refused again in 1975 and 1976, both times without any reasons
given. Liacouras, The Case of Felix Aranovich, 6 HUMAN RIGHTs 295 (1977).
60. Pettiti, supra note 56, at 292-93. Charges also are brought for minor offenses such as
violence, larceny or hooliganism. Both the serious and the minor charges have the effect of
discrediting the applicant and of deterring others from applying. Id.
61. Id. at 297.
62. Id. at 300.
63. Mehl & Rapoport, Soviet Policy of Separating, Families and the Right to Emigrate, 27
INTL & COMP. L.Q. 876, 879-80 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mehl]. Subsequent to the Helsinki
Final Act, statutory provisions governing exit from the Soviet Union have singled out a separate
category of stateless persons, which includes Jews wishing to leave the U.S.S.R. This change in
status is achieved by requiring applicants to surrender their Soviet citizenship and thus exit as
stateless persons. Accordingly, applicants must have substitute travel documents bearing a valid
exit visa and must pay another 500 rubles to renounce their citizenship and emigrate to a
capitalist country or Israel. Id. Since signing the Helsinki Final Act, the U.S.S.R. has simplified
its complex emigration procedures, but Jews seeking exit visas to Israel still face serious difficul-
ties. Turack, supra note 38, at 599-600. Moreover, the number of exit visas granted increased at
a constant rate both before and during the five month Belgrade Conference of October 4, 1977,
during which the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act was formally evaluated. Id. at 585-
86, 606-07.
64. See note 5 supra.
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The Soviet Union is obligated under international law to respect the right
of individuals to emigrate. 65 As as general rule, recognized rights may be
suspended by a state only in time of war or extreme emergency threatening
the survival of the nation.66 Freedom of emigration can fall within this
exception because in such circumstances a nation in need of all available
manpower may not be able to dispense with those who wish to emigrate. No
crisis threatens the Soviet Union today, however, that would justify this
treatment of prospective Jewish emigrants. 67
Several restrictions on the right to emigrate in nonemergency situations
are permitted under the international agreements that the Soviet Union has
ratified. For example, article 12 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
prohibits restrictions on the freedom of emigration except as provided by law
and as necessary to protect national security, public order, health or morals,
or the rights and freedoms of others. 68 There are reports, however, of
many cases in which Jews have been refused permission to emigrate, al-
though none of these criteria were met. 69 Soviet rejection of those emigra-
tion requests constitutes a systematic violation tinder international law of the
collective right of Jews to preservation of their group identity. 70 Moreover,
to entrust emigration decisions to administrative officials unfettered by stan-
dards or guidelines runs afoul of the Soviet Constitution, in particular article
34, which grants equal rights to citizens of the U.S.S.R. irrespective of race
or nationality.
Emigration requests by Soviet Jews have in other cases led officials to
misapply substantive law in the area of domestic relations, affecting both
parental custody of children and religious and educational freedom. For
example, the State may find that parents who apply for exit visas have failed
to rear their children in accordance with the precepts of Communism and
65. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26, art. 12;
Racism Convention, supra note 31, art. 5(d); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 47, art. 13. Cf. Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 34 (providing that the contracting
states, as far as possible, agree to assimilate and naturalize refugees as defined in art. 1). See
also Chalidze, The Expulsion and Expatriation in International Law: The Right to Leave, to
Stay and to Return, PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 122, 132 (1973).
66. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26, art. 4. Cf. Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 30, art. 15. See Higgins, Derogations, supra note 30, at 281,
286-88.
67. Dinstein, Freedom of Emigration and Soviet Jewry, 4 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 266,
268 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dinstein, Emigration].
68. These restrictions must be consistent with other rights provided in the Covenant.
69. Dinstein, Emigration, supra note 67, at 268-73.
70. Dinstein, Emigration, supra note 67, at 273. See also Mehl, supra note 63, at 879-82
(arguing that the conditions on the right to emigrate which the U.S.S.R. has imposed do not
find support in any of the major international human rights instruments). Professor Dinstein
argues further that a state unable or unwlling to protect the identity of a human group must at
least allow individual members the chance to preserve their future elsewhere. The greater the
oppression and discrimination against a group, the more compelling is the need to allow emigra-
tion. Therefore, fewer, rather than more, restrictions should be placed on the right of Soviet
Jews to'leave the U.S.S.R. Dinstein, Emigration, supra note 67, at 273.
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thereby deprive them of parental rights. The grounds for making this deter-
mination need not follow positive law. Instead, the visa application can be
equated with the parents' failure to instill Communist ideals in the child. 71
Thus, the abstractions of political ideology embodied in the Soviet Constitu-
tion 72 can render unlawful an emigration request that is found to be in con-
71. One case is that of Temkin, a Jewish father who was denied custody of his daughter
based on testimony that he had turned her against the Soviet way of life by encouraging her to
learn about and participate in Jewish cultural activities. Temkin had sought to emigrate to Israel
with his daughter and her mother, from whom he had obtained a divorce. A court granted the
mother custody of the child, but Temkin took the girl from her mother's home. The mother
then brought proceedings in the Moscow local people's court to regain custody. The court
deprived Temkin of parental rights after hearing testimony that he had encouraged his daughter
to participate in Jewish cultural activities such as learning Hebrew, going to synagogue, and
wearing a Star of David, and had thereby turned her against the Soviet way of life. Also,
because the child missed a number of school classes, Temkin was charged with failure to edu-
cate her. Kiralfy, A Postscript on Consequential Breeches of Legality in Civil Proceedings, I
REV. SOCIALIST L. 113, 114-115 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kiralfy]. See Fundamentals of
Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Marriage and the Family, art. 18 in
FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS 345 (M. Saifulin
& Y. Sdobnikov trans. 1974) [hereinafter cited as USSR Family Law Legislation]. Temkin was
deprived of parental rights on the basis of the anti-social influence he had on his daughter, but
this finding was supported mainly by the fact that he allowed her to take part in Jewish cultural
activities. Kiralfy, supra, at 117.
Arguably, the court's decision was consistent with the Constitution in finding that Temkin
failed to rear his child to be a worthy member of Communist society. See CONSTITUTION, supra note
2, art. 66. The court ignored, however, certain of Temkin's constitutional rights. By denying
him parental rights on the grounds of his involvement in Jewish culture, the court violated his
right to freedom of assembly. See id., art. 50. It also failed to consider his right to freedom of
religion. Id. art. 52. Even if Temkin's advokat did not raise these issues, they were presump-
tively within the scope of the court's inquiry as one of the duties of judges, prosecution and
defense to search objectively for the truth. See Osakwe, Due Process, supra note 1, at 281; note
92 infra.
Moreover, depriving Temkin of parental rights because he exposed his daughter to Jewish
culture is inconsistent with the obligation of the Soviet government under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 27, art. 15(1), that citizens be
allowed to take part in cultural life. The court's actions also denied Temkin his rights under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26, to freedom of religion (art.
18) and the right to peaceful assembly (art. 21). Finally, under the Convention against Dis-
crimination in Education, adopted December 14, 1960, 361 U.N.T.S. 94, art. 5, which the
U.S.S.R. ratified in 1962, parents have the right to ensure that their children receive religious
and moral education in conformity with their own convictions. Boim, Review Article: Human
Rights in the USSR, 2 REV. SOCIALIST L. 173, 175 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Boim, Human
Rights]. This provision appears to conflict with the U.S.S.R. Family Law Legislation, supra, art.
18, which requires parents to rear their children "in the spirit of the moral code of the builder
of Communism." Despite the guarantee of the Convention, should a Soviet court decide that
children are being reared contrary to this moral code, parents.may be deprived of their parental
rights under U.S.S.R. Family Law Legislation, supra, art. 19. Such action has been taken not
only against Jews, but also against Baptists. Boim, Human Rights, supra, at 175.
72. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. 66 (providing that Soviet citizens have a duty to
show concern that their children are brought up to be "worthy members of socialist society").
See also Feldbrugge, Study, supra note 5, at 212 (arguing that the new Soviet Constitution is an
elaborate reaffirmation of ideological and political doctrines). The preamble and first five chap-
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flict. The ordinary guarantees of domestic law simply do not afford adequate
protection to applicants in such circumstances.
The government frequently responds to Jewish visa applicants by wrong-
fully dismissing them from employment. This action may be followed by
making it impossible for them to obtain new employment in their specialized
trade or profession 73 or by finding them to be unqualified for their posi-
tion. 74 The latter determination could be made on the basis of the
employee's nationality, his or her Party affiliation, or the extent to which he
or she participates in social life. 75 Alleged possession of employment-
related state secrets is another response to visa requests and is used as
grounds to deny permission to emigrate, despite the employee's showing to
the contrary. 76
These discriminatory employment practices conflict with article 34 of the
Soviet Constitution, which establishes the equality of all citizens in economic
endeavors. Individuals who find it impossible to acquire fresh employment
also are denied the right to work as provided in article 40 of the Constitu-
tion. Furthermore, these practices are inconsistent with rights guaranteed
under international law that prohibit discrimination in employment due to
membership in a national, religious, or linguistic group.77 Similarly, the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights prohibits discrimination
in employment based on race, language, religion, or national origin by
guaranteeing all individuals the right to work and the right to freely choose
one's occupation. 78
b. Internal Passport System
A more subtle example of Soviet governmental control of its Jewish minor-
ity is the internal passport system. Regulations recently enacted to imple-
ment this system require each individual traveling within Soviet territory to
carry on his or her person a prescribed document identifying the holder and,
ters largely contain declarations "'which are almost devoid of legal significance" and which are
almost verbatim statements of the Program of CPSU. Id.
73. This claim was made in the Temkin case, note 71 supra. See Kiralfy, supra note 71, at
118-19.
74. See Fundamentals of Labour Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, art. 17
(2) in FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGISLATION OF THE U.S.S.R. AND THE UNION REPUBLICS 98 (M.
Saifulin & Y. Sdobnikov trans. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Saifulin], which permits the dismissal
of an employee on the grounds that he is unqualified for his position.
75. Kiralfy, supra note 71, at 119.
76. This was also a problem in the Aranovich case. See note 59 supra.
77. International Labour Organization Convention (No. 111) concerning discrimination in
employment and occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 32, art. 1. The Soviet Union ratified
this Convention on January 31, 1961. See Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 44, at 218 & 229,
n.12.
78. Article 2 of the Covenant, supra note 27, prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of
the rights guaranteed under the Covenant on the basis of, inter alia, race, language, religion, or
national origin. Article 6 guarantees the right to work and the right to freely choose one's




inter alia, stating his or her nationality. 79 Although the new passport sys-
tem is viewed as a liberalization of restrictions on movement within the
Soviet Union, in reality the record of nationality enhances the possibility of
nationality-based discrimination in education, employment, and social ac-
commodation, 80 all of which are impermissible under the Constitution. In
particular, denial of the equality of all Soviet citizens before the law in pur-
suit of economic and social endeavors (article 34) and of the equal rights of
Soviet citizens of different races and nationalities (article 36) is forbidden.
If the internal passport system were used to discriminate against Jews, this
practice would constitute a denial of protections guaranteed to Soviet citi-
zens under article 12 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
provides that every person lawfully within the territory of a state has the
right to freedom of movement and to choice of residence. Such discrimina-
tion also would evidence a failure to comply with the Racism Conven-
tion. 81 Article 1 defines racial discrimination as, inter alia, any exclusion or
restriction based on national or ethnic origin for the purpose of denying
equality in the enjoyment of human rights in political, economic, social, and
cultural endeavors. Article 4 requires signatory states to forbid their gov-
ernment officials from pronoting racial discrimination, and article 5 guaran-
tees that everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within a state's borders. If the Soviet government uses the internal passport
system for purposes of racial discrimination that result in denials of educa-
tional, employment, and social opportunities for Soviet Jews as well as re-
strictions on their freedom of movement and residence, then it clearly fails
to fulfill specific international obligations.
c. Criminal Procedure and Imprisonment
Perhaps the most widespread human rights violations against Soviet Jews
have occurred in the context of guaranteed due process of law in criminal
procedure. Abuses exist within the procedural stage of investigation and in-
dictment as well as in the conditions of confinement. For example, serious
or unsupportable charges have been brought and the harshest penalties im-
79. "'The Passport System of the U.S.S.R." and "Certain Instructions Concerning Registra-
tion" were adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Supreme Soviet on August 28, 1974.
Boim, The Passport System in the U.S.S.R., 2 REv. SOCIALIST L. 15 (1976). The purposes of
the passport system are: (1) to provide documentation for administrative identification; (2) to
facilitate supervision of population movement and dispersal throughout the country, in addition
to requiring a registration document (propiska) for people entering one area or region from
another; and (3) to aid supervision by internal security organs. Id. at 41.
80. In addition to ensuring proper identification of Jews, recording of nationality has been
preserved in the new passport system to prevent members of other nationalities from "becom-
ing" Jews so as to submit applications for emigration from the U.S.S.R., despite all the obstacles
that exist. Id. at 41. Moreover, it is a tool to prevent the return to their native land of banished
Crimean Tarters, who otherwise would be able to conceal their identity. Id.
81. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
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posed where the facts would support greater leniency. 82 Further, the right
to present a defense, guaranteed tinder Soviet law as evidence of a viable
and developed legal system, 83 frequently is not available to political offend-
82. Such a case involved several Soviet Jews who illegally attempted to leave the U.S.S.R.
in June of 1970 by commandeering a small plane and flying it to Sweden. Lapenna, supra note
58, at 82-83. The defendants could have been prosecuted under the conventional, relatively
lenient charges of illegal exit abroad and perhaps extortion of state property. Criminal Code of
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, arts. 83, 95, in SOVIET CRIMINAL LAv AND
PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES (Berman & Spindler trans. 1966) 183, 189 [hereinafter cited as
RSFSR Criminal Code]. Instead most were tried for treason and theft of valuable. government
property-crimes carrying the maximum penalty of execution or fifteen years imprisonment.
See RSFSR Criminal Code, supra, art. 23. See also Osakwe, Analysis, supra note 55, at 459-61;
Comment, The Death Penalty in the Soviet Union, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 225, 226 (1977). Two
defendants in the 1970 case were in fact sentenced to death, but the sentences were later
commuted. The remaining defendants were sentenced to prison terms varying from four to
fifteen years. Lapenna, supra note 58, at 83. For a detailed account of this case, see T. TAYLOR,
COURTS OF TERROR 6-10 (1976).
In other cases, charges have been brought which have lacked factual bases. For example, a
trial in Kishinev against nine Jewish dissidents was based on a charge of conspiracy to distribute
subversive literature. Defendants were indicted for the crime of anti-Soviet agitation and prop-
aganda. RSFSR Criminal Code, supra, art. 70. See note 144 and accompanying text infra. One
commentator has concluded, however, that the literature at issue in this qase could not reasona-
bly be read as violating this provision. Dershowitz, supra note 53, at 257.
A final example is the case of Shkolnick, an uneducated Ukrainian Jew who applied for an exit
visa and was subsequently arrested and charged with espionage for Great Britain. See RSFSR
Criminal Code, supra, art. 65. This charge was based on evidence that Shkolnick had be-
friended several British scientists. The British denied any knowledge of Shkolnick, so the charge
was changed to spying for Israel, even though the authorities failed to allege that he had had
any contact with Israel. They argued instead that the defendant would provide Israel with secret
information when he arrived. Shkolnick was eventually sentenced to seven years in prison. This
decision implies that any espionage conviction can be justified if the evidence discloses that the
defendant applied for an exit visa and continued to work in a factory that deals in materials or
processes that might be useful to the Israeli government. Dershowitz, supra note 53, at 258. It
also suggests that an indictment need not be supported by sufficient allegations of fact, and that
the evidentiary standard for conviction is low, certainly less than guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the courts accept a lower evidentiary standard, they might be willing in such cases to
give decisive weight to the conclusion of the prosecutor's office (prokuratura) that the accused is
guilty. This practice would conflict with the admonition of Soviet criminal procedure that all
participants in the criminal process-investigators, procurator and court-thoroughly investi-
gate both sides of every case. See Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure of the USSR and the
Union Republics, art. 14 in SAIFULIN, supra note 74, at 276 [hereinafter cited as USSR Crimi-
nal Procedure]. It also would violate Russian Criminal Procedure, which requires that courts
base their decisions solely on the evidence presented at trial. Code of Criminal Procedure of
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, art. 301 in BERMAN, supra at 372 [hereinafter
cited as RSFSR Criminal Procedure]. The procurator's belief as to defendant's guilt should not
be considered at trial and, therefore, should have no bearing on the outcome. See Fletcher, The
Presumption of Innocence in the Soviet Union, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1203, 1221 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Fletcher]. For a discussion of the role of the prokuratura in the Soviet legal
system, see Savitski, Institutions for the Administration of Criminal Justice in BASSIOUNI &
SAVITSKI, supra note 7, at 16-29.
83. Fundamentals of Legislation on the Judicial System of the USSR and the Union and
Autonomous Republics, art. 12 [hereinafter cited as USSR Judicial Legislation] in SAIFULIN,
supra note 74, at 140; USSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82, art. 13.
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ers or to those being investigated by the Soviet secret police because of
institutional restrictions on Soviet lawyers who represent or seek to repre-
sent clients in political trials. 84 Indeed, although the CPSU is receptive to
the views of jurists, it severely restricts the independence of the legal pro-
fession. 85
Cases also have been reported in which the rights to present a defense
and to present evidence on behalf of the accused were denied. Underlying
most trials of Jewish dissidents, for example, is the charge of possessing and
distributing anti-Soviet literature and propaganda. 86 Several such defend-
ants have admitted distributing literature, but have denied that it was prop-
aganda. Soviet courts have refused to hear that argument, however, holding
the issue to be foreclosed by the ex parte determinations of experts in the
secret censorship agency Glavlit. This procedural device violates the de-
cree 8 7 of the Supreme Soviet that trial judges must not rely too heavily on
the conclusions of experts and that all evidence bearing on the experts' con-
clusions should be reviewed. 8 Moreover, the substantive effect of this
practice is to deny the accused the right to present a defense. 89 To these
judicial tactics may be added the numerous reported instances in which de-
fendants were denied the right to present any witnesses, a limitation in
theory prohibited by Soviet criminal procedure. 90
84. Dershowitz, supra note 53, at 260-61. In such cases, only KGB-approved and Collegium
of Lawyers-certified advokats are allowed to represent clients. These lawyers almost always urge
clients to plead guilty and generally limit themselves to presenting personal arguments in miti-
gation of sentence. Such conduct disregards the requirement that defense counsel take all steps
necessary to exculpate a defendant, to mitigate his or her responsibility, and generally to render
all necessary legal assistance. See USSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82, art. 23. Treatment
of attorneys who wish to represent clients in politically sensitive cases can be very harsh. In the
case of Feldman, for example, the advokat's name was removed from the list of practitioners
because of his defense of a dissident Jew who sought to emigrate. Lapenna, supra note 58, at
82. Similarly, in the case of Shchransky, a Moscow attorney was approached by Shchransky's
mother in June, 1977, to defend her son. This attorney agreed to undertake the defense but was
expelled from the U.S.S.R. following an application for KGB approval. Caine, Government of
the Commissars for the Commissars, 7 HuM. RTS. 21, 23 (1978).
85. Barry & Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Barry]. The Party influence historically has imbued the Soviet legal profession
with a political orientation. In the early days of the Soviet State, the courts were urged to
decide cases based on a flexible standard of the judge's "socialist conscience." Even as Soviet
jurisprudence has developed, the CPSU has continued to stress the preservation of the political
perspective. Accordingly, court decisions continue to conform to current Party policies.
Nevertheless, no policy has been officially adopted that would promote uncertainty in the law
through overbroad application of the codes. Instead, the trend has been toward stability, not
flexibility. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS, supra note 5, at 89-91.
86. See RSFSR Criminal Code, supra note 82, art. 70.
87. Decrees or resolutions (postanovlenia) are one of four basic forms of legal acts issued by
the Supreme Soviet and the highest governmental organs of the State. It is in the nature of an
administrative regulation.
88. Dershowitz, supra note 53, at 262.
89. RSFSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82, art. 19.
90. E.g., id. arts. 46, 51 and 245. In the case of Kaminsky, for example, witnesses were
interrupted when they began to present evidence favorable to the defendant. In some instances,
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Denial of the right to present a defense and evidence are indicative of the
manner in which principles of the Soviet legal system are manipulated to
achieve results apparently favorable to the State at the expense of Soviet
human rights commitments. The right to present a defense is closely related
to the concept of a presumption of innocence. Although this presumption is
not explicitly codified in Soviet law, a number of provisions exist, which,
when read together, embody all of its guarantees. 91 A defendant who can-
not raise a defense or offer favorable evidence in response to charges is not
presumed innocent, and his or her trial becomes a mere formality in which
the court implicitly presumes guilt from the defendant's initial appearance.
The role of the judiciary thus deteriorates into one that simply ratifies the
criminal investigation, and the presumption of innocence, while theoretically
available, is limited in practice.
The duty of the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel to search objec-
tively for the truth 92 is another principle that is frequently restricted or
misapplied. When a defendant is barred from presenting a defense or from
introducing favorable evidence, those responsible for determining guilt or
innocence have failed to act in a disinterested manner. Instead, the in-
they were forcibly removed from the courtroom in violation of the requirement that witnesses
be examined by all participants, id. art. 283. See Dershowitz, supra note 53, at 261-62.
91. The chief difficulty in construing the presumption of innocence from Soviet codes is that
most jurisdictions recognize a procedural connotation whereby the burden of producing evi-
dence and convincing the tribunal of the guilt of the accused is imposed on the prosecution.
Originally, the concept of burden of proof was regarded as only loosely applicable in the Soviet
system and was not imposed on the courts, which always had been responsible for questioning
the accused and witnesses. Berman & Quigley, Comment on the Presumption of Innocence
Under Soviet Low, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1230, 1232 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Berman & Quig-
ley]. The resolution of this difficulty took form in the USSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82,
which avoided the use of the term "'presumption of innocence" but provided instead a lengthy
list of provisions designed to prevent the accused from being convicted unless his or her guilt
was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Berman & Quigley, supra, at 1232-33. This princi-
ple also is implicit in the CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. 160, which notes that "[nlo one
may be adjudged guilty of a crime and subjected to punishment as a criminal except by sen-
tence of a court and in conformity with the law." See generally Savitsky, Protection of Human
Rights in Criminal Procedure in U.S.S.R., 49 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 389
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Savitsky, Protection]. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that the
court will assume the guilt of the accused based merely on finding that the prokuratura, the
guardian of Socialist legality, believes in the defendant's guilt and commences prosecution ac-
cordingly. Although not codified in the legislative reform of 1958, the presumption of innocence
is still an important principle of Soviet legal rhetoric and should thus exhort the court not to
agree automatically with the prosecution. Fletcher, supra note 82, at 1214. It also reinforces the
command that the pretrial investigator be thorough and impartial in preparing the case against
the accused. Id. at 1214-15.
92. See Osakwe, Due Process, supra note 1, at 281. In theory, the Soviet system is in-
quisitorial rather than accusatorial. The judges, prosecution and defense are the main partici-
pants in the trial process and are bound to seek the truth as their primary duty. Both judges and
prosecution are bound to bring out incriminating as well as exonerating aspects of criminal
cases, while the defense counsel usually is in practice confined to seeking an acquittal or mitiga-
tion of punishment. Id. See also Savitsky, Protection, supra note 91, at 390.
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criminating details of the case are emphasized, and the exonerating aspects
are disregarded. Under present circumstances no member of this tripartite
structure can be said to be working to defend the rights and legal interests
of the accused in this class of cases.
The presumption of innocence and the duty of objectivity that is imposed
on the legal profession are principles designed for the same purpose-the
fair and evenhanded treatment of all persons accused of criminal offenses.
This objective is sacrificed when the individuals who seek to invoke these
principles are officially viewed as a threat to the State. In such cases, the
ends of Socialism, rather than the protection of individual rights, assume
priority.
In addition to discriminatory treatment within the trial setting, Soviet
Jews also suffer human rights violations in the conditions of their penal con-
finement. Prisoners accused of criminal acts have been denied rights under
Soviet law most notably during preinvestigative detention.93 While Soviet
law provides for a number of rights designed to safeguard prisoners from
unfair or unduly severe deprivations, Jewish prisoners are often confined
with and sometimes supervised by former Nazis who remain incorrigible
anti-Semites. 94 They also are prevented from freely exercising their religi-
ous beliefs during incarceration, despite the guarantees of Soviet law. 95
93. One well known case of unlawful confinement is that of Shchransky whose dissident
activities centered on promotion of the human rights provision of the Helsinki Final Act. His
application for an exit visa to Israel in 1973 was denied on the grounds that he possessed state
secrets. Shchransky was arrested in 1977, and as of February 20, 1978, he had neither been
formally charged, nor allowed to communicate with family, friends or counsel. The Soviet secret
police (the KGB) informed Shchransky's mother that he was being investigated on the charge of
treason, an offense punishable by death. See Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR
and the Union Republics, art. 22, in SAIFULIN, supra note 74, at 246 [hereinafter cited as
USSR Criminal Legislation]; RSFSR Criminal Code, supra note 82, art. 64. In addition, a
special secret decree enacted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet extended by six months
the time Shchransky would be held incommunicado and further investigated. It was probable
that his trial would he held in secret because state secrets allegedly were involved. Caine,
supra note 84, at 21-23. Although Soviet law provides for preinvestigative detention, under no
circumstances is this to exceed nine months. USSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82, art. 34.
See Osakwe, Due Process, supra note 1, at 376-77. Shchransky has been confined for more than
the limit prescribed by law. There is also no provision in Soviet law permitting the incom-
municado confinement of persons accused of crimes. Moreover, the secret decree by which
Shchransky's period of confinement was extended, while not a literal violation of Soviet law, was
nevertheless an abuse of authority, for it had the effect of denying him the fundamental guaran-
tees of Soviet law. The possibility exists that an illegal secret trial will be held, in light of the
failure to make formal charges. Finally, Shchransky's inability to procure counsel means that
Soviet authorities have been unchecked in their treatment of him so that violations of his rights
will continue to go undetected. See USSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82, art. 22 (provid-
ing that defense counsel is allowed to participate in the case when the accused is informed of
the completion of the preliminary investigation).
94. Dershowitz, supra note 53, at 262.
95. Id. at 263. Restrictions on this right must be reasonably related to the administration of
the prison. Id.
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The Soviet government's disregard for the due process rights of Jews, be-
sides being contrary to Soviet domestic law, also falls short of certain inter-
national obligations, the most significant of which are set forth in the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant provides that no one shall
be arrested or detained arbitrarily, that anyone arrested be promptly in-
formed of the charges, and that anyone arrested and detained shall be enti-
tled to a trial within a reasonable period of time or be released. 96 It also
requires that all persons tried for criminal offenses are entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law, that they be allowed to present a defense and communicate
with counsel of their choice, and that they be permitted to present witnesses
on their behalf. 97
Additional evidence of the Soviet Union's purported commitment to due
process guarantees is found in the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners, 9" for which it voted on July 31, 1957.99 Although the
Rules were passed as a U.N. resolution and thus are only recommenda-
tory, 100 they nevertheless evidence the Soviet Union's theoretical recogni-
tion that the interests of individual prisoners rise above those of prison au-
thorities who may be unduly oppressive in maintaining order. Specifically,
the Rules provide that punishment shall not be inflicted unless the prisoner
is informed of the alleged offense and given an opportunity to present a
defense. 1l Prisoners also are to be allowed to communicate with family
and friends1 0 2 and to practice their religion freely. 103
At the most fundamental level, none of the ends of Socialist legality' 0 4 are
served by violating the due process rights of Soviet Jews. The organizational
integrity of society is not strengthened, because these violations occur in
spite of legally-defined social relationships. Further, conflicts are not re-
solved in a consistent and predictable manner, because the legal prescrip-
tions for resolution are circumvented. The accused or convict is not reedu-
cated, but instead suffers such terrible indignity that resocialization becomes
impossible. Finally, the "punishment" imposed either before trial or follow-
ing conviction is hardly justifiable as a deterrent to illegal conduct, for the
punishment itself is not provided by law. These violations of due process
are, in short, violations of Socialist legality. In essence, they are contrary to
Marxist-Leninist morality, with which the law of the U.S.S.R. is said to be
inextricably bound.
96. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26, art. 9(1)-(3).
97. Id., art. 14(1), (3).
98. E.S.C. Res. 663 C XXIV (1957) [hereinafter cited as Rules].
99. Dershowitz, supra note 53, at 263.
100. BRIERtY, supra note 11, at 380-84, 387-88. Cf. U.N. Charter arts. 10-11 (providing that
the functions and powers of the General Assembly are confined to debate and the making of
recommendations).
101. Rules, supra note 98, para. 30(2).
102. Id., para. 37.
103. Id., paras. 41 and 42.
104. See note 7 supra.
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Treatment of Other Soviet Minorities
a. Indigenous Peoples
Long-standing Soviet policy aims at creating a federation of indigenous
nationalities in which once-backward peoples develop economically and cul-
turally at an accelerated pace. This goal, as envisioned by the Russian-
dominated Soviet government, establishes the foundation for the relationship
between the federal government and its constituent nation-states (the Union
Republics) and between lesser political subdivisions. 105 In this evolutionary
process, the Soviet government often fails to protect the human rights of
many national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups.
The policy of federation springs from the Marxist-Leninist goal of organiz-
ing every nation's economic forces, thereby transforming citizen behavior
and attitudes so that values necessary to hasten the advent of Communism
are internalized. The primary function of law in this evolutionary social
phase is twofold. First, it promotes social organization through definition of
legal relationships and delineation of normative legal standards. It also des-
ignates behavior deemed contrary to Communist principles and thereby re-
fines mass education. 106 Those who deviate from the law, therefore, not
only infringe upon the interests of other individuals, but also pose an actual
threat to the success of Party policies. 107
Practical application of these principles has led to government repression
of non-Slavic groups, especially Islamic peoples and nomadic tribes of Cen-
tral Asia, whose behavior is viewed as incompatible with Soviet standards.
To promote the general goal of socialist transformation, the Soviet govern-
ment has achieved modification of the behavior of these groups by declaring
disfavored customs to be what one commentator has termed "traditional
105. See CoNsIrurION, supra note 2, art. 76. The Constitution describes each Union Re-
public as "a sovereign socialist Soviet state.'" The Soviet Union today consists of a federation of
fifteen Union Republics. The name of each Republic is derived from its majority population. In
theory, the Union Republics are equal, sovereign, and free to develop as they choose. The
purpose of federation is to ensure fraternal cooperation among the peoples. Federation is evi-
denced by the existence of organs of state power and state administration, common armed
forces, citizenship, budget, and monetary and credit systems. The powers of the Union Repub-
lics are vested in their own constitutions, which take account of special local features ht ulti-
inately must conform to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. In the event of a conflict, both the
federal constitution and federal legislation are supreme. Tin. SOVIET STATE AND LAW 96-102
(V. Chkhikvadze ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW]. Besides the
Union Republics, there are twenty Autonomous Republics, sixteen of which are in the Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). The Autonomous Republics are Soviet socialist
states that are part of and subordinate to the Union Republics. Also subordinate to the Union
Republics are the Autonomous Regions, which are national territories within the Union Repub-
lics and are inhabitated by a distinct nationality preserving its own way of life. Finally, the
National Areas provide small nationalities with administrative self-government in domestic af-
fairs. Id. at 109-11.
106. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
107. David, supra note 5, at 196-97.
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crimes."' 0  Prosecution for such offenses does not depend upon a victim's
complaint, but rather upon conduct which conflicts with established
policies. 109
Prosecution for traditional crimes also has deprived some minorities" 0  in
the U.S.S.R. of rights protected, by implication, tinder international law.
Such legal action weakens the physical integrity of these groups, thus mak-
ing discrimination, when it exists, easier to practice and more difficult to
detect. "I Ironically, the traditional crimes approach, by prohibiting certain
customary practices, has resulted in greater legal protection for certain
classes within non-Slavic minorities, particularly Islamic women. 112
108. Feldbrugge, Criminal Law and Traditional Society: The Role of Soviet Law in the Inte-
gration of Non-Slavic Peoples, 3 REv. SOCIALIST L. 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Feldbrugge,
Traditional].
109. The policies that this legislation sought to advance are based on an ideological
framework adhered to by Soviet authorities, who view Socialism and Communism as stages in
inevitable social progress. Thus, they are intolerant of what is regarded as backwardness. If
initial attempts at education and persuasion fail, force and repression are the last resorts. By
characterizing non-Slavic customs as "crimes" punishable under Soviet law, society will be free
of customs such as buying brides, the practice of polygamy or paying blood money (as a con-
sequence of intertribal feuds). Id. at 10-11. The advancement of these policies also has meant
that the Soviet government shows greater interest in over-all social and political effects than in
individual welfare. Id. at 15-16.
110. Soviet minorities can be categorized in three ways recognized by international law:
ethnic, religious and linguistic. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 26, art. 27. A minority also can be described as ethnic and religious, e.g., Soviet Jewry, as
well as ethnic and linguistic, e.g., Germans dispersed over the whole territory of the U.S.S.R.
and lacking any coherent territorial unit. Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 44, at 219.- ,
111. The right to preservation of separate identities of minorities has been defined as "the
right to preserve the characteristics which distinguish a group from the majority-their tradi-
tions and racial peculiarities." Although neither U.N. Covenant makes such an express distinc-
tion, certain U.N. treaties and conventions can be interpreted as preserving the separate iden-
tities of minorities. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
26, art. 27; Convention against Discrimination in Education, December 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S.
94, art. 5, § 1, para. c; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 27, art. 13(3). See Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 44, at 220.
112. While the traditional crimes approach has weakened the social and cultural integrity of
certain indigenous groups, the position of women, especially in Islamic societies, has been im-
proved by prohibitions against behavior which affected the free choice of women to marry.
Thus, the acquisition of a wife through payment of a bride price (kalyin), in those parts of the
U.S.S.R. where Islam prevails, was outlawed. Feldbrugge, Traditional, supra note 108, at
17-18. Other means of forcing a woman to marry against her will were also proscribed. These
included offenses for marrying a woman who was not sexually mature or had not reached mar-
riageable age, or for concluding contracts regarding a future marriage of children under age. It
was also criminal to prevent a woman from marrying the man of her choice or to force her to
leave her husband. Id. at 19. Bigamy and polygamy also are regarded as traditional crimes, but
the attitudes of Soviet authorities toward suppression of such behavior has not been as relent-
less. Id. at 21. Similarly, men have been regarded as victims of traditional crimes, primarily
through inter-tribal feuds, the central offense of which is the blood-feud (revenge for the killing
of a relative by killing a member of a rival tribe). Id. at 22-23. These crimes are dealt with
through a pacification commission which mediates disputes. These also are dealt with as com-
mon crimes such as homicide, manslaughter, assault and battery, etc. Another traditional of-
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Other Soviet government practices directed toward limiting autonomy of
Soviet minorities have few corresponding beneficial effects. For instance, the
right to an education in one's own language (and to offical use of one's native
language), enjoyed by most nations and nationalities of the U.S.S.R., is de-
nied to people who are dispersed throughout the country, such as Jews and
Germans. 113 Systematic religious training for minors is governed by article
142 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, 114 which forbids the establishment of
institutions for religious instruction of children. 115 Strict enforcement of
fense is the custom among nomadic tribes of Central Asia of seizing cattle without the intention
of appropriating them. Id. at 23. This practice was originally a way of enforcing a claim in a
society which had no central authority to do so. Id.
The Soviet Union has been very successful in the prevention and suppression of traditional
crimes. The only contemporary criminal code of a Union Republic that still retains provisions
against such conduct is that of the Russian Federated Socialist Republic. The reason is that
these crimes still occur frequently within the Republic. Id. at 40. Thus, because traditional
crimes are no longer listed in the criminal codes of most Union Republics, their legal disappear-
ance has occurred, although some commentators believe that they have not in fact been totally
eradicated. Such crimes continue to exist in isolated pockets of the larger regions of the
U.S.S.R., which means that they still exist in predominantly Islamic parts of Central Asia
though now camouflaged by the less-easily penetrated defenses of the family. Id. at 39. See also
DAVID, supra note 5, at 443.
The efforts by the Soviet government to eradicate traditional crimes are pointed to as evi-
dence that the Soviet system will eventually eliminate all crime. See DAVID, supra note 5, at
160. Moreover, the Soviet government's success in combatting this behavior is at least arguably
a positive achievement in advancing human rights. It can be said that the elimination of tradi-
tional crimes is consonant with article 35 of the Soviet Constitution which guarantees the equal
rights of men and women, and of Articles 2 and 3 of both UN. Covenants, supra notes 26-30,
which together provide that all men and women shall have equal social, economic, cultural, and
political rights. The struggle against traditional crimes has been coordinated with massive
economic and financial assistance from the federal government to "backward" Republics. This
assistance is reflective of the socialist nature of the national policy, the main premise of which is
that economic equality is a necessary precondition to all other forms of equality. See THE
SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 105, at 107. It is pointed out, however, that one important
reason for the decline in the frequency of traditional offenses is that an urban and an industrial
system has replaced the more ancient and traditional cultures where these behaviors prevailed.
Feldbrugge, Traditional, supra note 108, at 37-39. Another commentator argues that the highly
regimented Soviet society has aims that are so rigid that many people are unable to subscribe.
Thus, they seek alternatives and run afoul of the law, usually in the form of spontaneous of-
fenses in the area of general delinquency and thereby offset the gains made in combatting
traditional crimes. Shtromas, supra note 53, at 305-06.
113. Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 44, at 220-21. The use of native languages by
minorities is regarded by Soviet commentators as an integral feature of minority group au-
tonomy, which is defined as the "independent exercise of state power and broad self-
government." THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 105, at 108. Autonomy is said to be
expressed through local organs of power, the courts, administrative bodies, schools and socio-
political institutions. Native languages are authorized as the medium of expression in each of
these spheres. Id.
114. See note 82 supra.
115. Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 44, at 221.
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this provision creates another means by which religious minorities, especially
Jews and Baptists, can be persecuted. 116
Forced population dispersal also furthers government economic and social
policies. For example, Volga Germans were dispersed under Stalin and were
refused permission to return to their native land by Krushchev because the
government perceived them as a threat to Soviet political power. 117 Simi-
larly, Tartars, previously uprooted from their native Crimea, were forcibly
removed and deported when they sought, to return. They also were tried for
various crimes during the period of Stalinist renunciation. 118 As certain
populations were scattered, massive government-supported immigration of
non-indigenous persons took place, diluting the native populations and
threatening their group identity. This practice suggests that the Russian-
dominated U.S.S.R. has become a melting pot rather than, in accordance
with express Soviet policy, a multinational state comprised of a federation of
free, equal, and distinct peoples. 119 The Soviet policy of forced population
dispersal has thus had the effect of impairing the right of all peoples under
international law to the preservation of their group identity.
116. For a discussion of the persecution by Soviet authorities of Jews, Baptists, and other
minorities, see Grzybowski, Socialist Legality and Uncensored Literature in the Soviet Union,
10 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 299, 301-04 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Grzybowski, Uncen-
sored].
117. Id. at 303. Five nations punished by dispersal were allowed to return to their native
lands: the Balkars, Kalmyks, Karachais, Chechen and Chechen-Ingush. Along with rehabilitation
of dispersed nations, decrees ordering uprooting and dispersal were abolished under Krushchev.
Id.
118. Id. at 302-03. The plight of Crimean Tartars who tried to return to their homeland
aroused sympathy in the U.S.S.R. Uncensored magazines reported on the trials of Tartars sub-
jected to criminal prosecution, and Tartar appeals to government authorities were widely circu-
lated. Some dissidents who espoused this cause were placed in psychiatric institutions. Id. at
303. See generally notes 174-187 and accompanying text infra.
119. Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 44, at 221. Examples of mass immigration are the fol-
lowing:
1. The City of Riga, where in the 1970 census, Russians had attained a clear major-
ity over native Latvians.
2. Percentages of Russians in some Union Republics and Autonomous Republics
increased considerably from 1959 to 1970.
a. Ukrainian S.S.R. increased from 16.9% to 19.4%.
b. Latvian S.S.R. increased from 26.6% to 29.8%.
c. Estonian S.S.R. increased from 20.1% to 24.7%.
d. In the Karelian Autonomous Republic where Karelians decreased from 13.1%
to 11.8%, the number of Russians increased from 63.4% to 68.1%.
e. In the Komi Autonomous Republic, the Komi declined from 30.1% to 28.6%,
while Russians increased from 48.6% to 53.1%.
Id.
Also, the 1970 census figures demonstrated a "clear overweight" of Russians in certain Union
and Autonomous Republics, although this is not so in the majority of cases. In the Kazakh
Union Republic, there were 42% Russians and 32% Kazakhs. Similar figures occur in the
Bashkir, Karelian, Mordovian, Udmurt and lakut Autonomous Republics. The most extreme
imbalance occurred in the Jewish Autonomous Region with 145,000 Russians and 11,500 Jews.
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Minority group discrimination appears also in the overrepresentation of
Russians in the higher organs of state government. Representation of other
nationalities, which should have a voice at all levels of the decision-making
process, is severely limited. 120 Further, because minorities are generally
excluded from the Communist Party, certain positions in Soviet society
available only to Party members are 6ffectively closed to most nationalities
except Russians. 121 Party membership restrictions thus deny minorities any
meaningful control of their own Union Republics. 122
Uibopuu, Soviet Federation and the New Soviet Constitution, 5 REV. SOCIALIST L. 171, 181
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Uibopuu, Federalism].
In at least two cases, according to one Soviet commentator, population shifts have been at-
tributable to industrial development, The population of Kazakhstan after 1959 was 29.6%
Kazakhs and 43.1% Russians. This difference is said to be due to the transfer of many factories
from the central areas of the U.S.S.R. to Kazakhstan, to new construction projects and the
reclamation of land for agriculture. Similarly, large numbers of Ukranians have immigrated to
Siberia in the R.S.F.S.R. to work on hydroelectric power plants and major industrial enter-
prises. THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 105, at 97.
The structure of the Soviet State purportedly reflects distinctions in nationalities underlying
the Soviet federation, The highest organ of State, the Supreme Soviet, recognizes national dif-
ferences in its two constituent chambers: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of
Nationalities. The latter is said to represent the specific interests of all Soviet nationalities in
matters of the economy, culture, customs and traditions. Id. at 98. The principle of a federated,
multinational state, entered into on a voluntary and equalitarian basis and in the spirit of frater-
nal cooperation, is in theory fundamental to the concept of the Soviet State. Id. at 90-91. See
also Uibopuu, Federalism, supra, at 178 (pointing out that this principle is reiterated in the
1977 Constitution). See generally note 105 and accompanying text supra.
120. According to one Soviet commentator, the constituent Republics of the U.S.S.R. par-
ticipate equally in state organs regardless of population or territory. Each Union Republic has
ans equal number of deputies in the Soviet of Nationalities and its own representatives in the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and the U.S.S.R. Supreme
Court. Equal representation is regarded as vital in the administration of specific interests of the
Union Republics by the Soviet govensment. THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 105, at
98-99. Overrepresentation of Russians is unlikely to produce equal representation or effective
promotion of non-Russian interests. Instead, there is likely to be wider support for the policies
of the Russians, who dominate all central organs of state power.
121. Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 44, at 222. For example, the national origin of the
members of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers in 1976 was 53 Russians, 18 Ukrainians and 8
nationals of other groups. The ethnicity of the Soviet Communist Party shows overrepresenta-
tion of Russians, Georgians and Armenians in relation to their percentage in the U.S.S.R. popu-
lation. Another example dates back to the mid-1960's when Russian Jews attained the highest
Party membership among all nationalities of the U.S.S.R., but now are among the most under-
represented national group in local Soviets of the U.S.S.R. along with Germans, Poles, Ko-
reans, Greeks and Bulgarians. Additionally, the most underrepresented nations in the Con-
munist Party are Moldavians, Turkmen and Tadzhiks. The ratio between the best represented
nations and the worst is more than three to one. In Lithuania, Russians make up 8.6% of the
population but comprise 27% of the Republic's Communist Party Central Committee, 10% of
the representatives of Lithuania to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, and 23% of the Deputies in
the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. In Tadzhikistan, Russians make tip 11.9% of the population,
but comprise 24% of the membership of the local Communist Party. Id. at 222-23.
122. Underrepresentation of minorities in the CPSU and the resulting exclusion from the
decision-making process also denies them the enjoyment of their cultural rights and inhibits
their cultural survival as minorities. Id. at 223.
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The Soviet Constitution purports to recognize the need for minority rep-
resentation of the Union Republics. The Constitution grants them a special
position in the Soviet system in several ways, the most important of which is
recognizing their status as sovereign states (article 76). Along with national
status, the Constitution expressly provides the Republics with the incidents
of statehood, including the rights to: control boundaries and territorial sub-
divisions (articles 78 and 79); conclude treaties, exchange diplomatic and
consular representatives, and join international organizations (article 80); and
secede from the U.S.S.R. (article 72). The Constitution also permits Repub-
lics a voice in decision-making processes of the state organs and allows them
control of economic and social development within their territorial bound-
aries (article 77). In reality, however, central control exercised by the federal
system is so pervasive that the Union Republics are effectively incapable of
exercising their rights. Further, they lack the essential elements of state-
hood, including a distinct population, a defined territory, an autonomous
government, and the ability to honor international obligations.
Territorial definition of the Union Republics is similarly absent in any
practical sense, for the Constitution protects the territorial unity of the
U.S.S.R. (article 70). Further, the relative legislative powers of both the
U.S.S.R. and Union Republics, as well as the centralized Party structure,
largely nullify the right of statehood granted in article 76 of the Constitu-
tion. 123 Indeed, these factors combine to negate the presumption of state-
hood as recognized by international law. Unfortunately, the above articles do
not presuppose a territory upon which an autonomous state and its support-
ing structures can be established. 124 Moreover, the Union Republics are
not sufficiently self-governing to be regarded as independent because all
crucial legislative matters are entrusted to the federal government. 125 Fi-
nally, the Union Republics have failed to demonstrate competence to carry
123. See Uibopuu, International Legal Personality of Union Republics of U.S.S.R., 24 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 811, 820-22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Uibopuu, Personality].
124. Id. at 816-17. See generally Crawford, supra note 28, at 111.
125. Uibopuu, Personality, supra note 123, at 821-22, 824. These matters include foreign
relations, federal military powers, admission of new members into the Union, protection of
public order and state security, and control of the nation's economy and federal budget. See
CONs'rITUTION, supra note 2, art. 73. The sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. in its relations with the
Union Republics also is evident from the following:
1. the constitutions of the Union Republics must conform to the U.S.S.R. Constitu-
tion;
2. Soviet law prevails in the event of a conflict;
3. the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is empowered to annul enactments of the
Union Republics' Councils of Ministers; and
4. the Union Republics are subject to certain "guiding principles" in their external
relations and military organization.
THE SOVIEr STATE, AND LAW, supra note 105, at 101. The Union Republics are effectively
deprived of the ability to govern a given territory, except for authority allocated by the federal
government, and thus prevented from exercising the right of self-determination. See Crawford,
supra note 28, at 116-19. See also Uibopuu, Federalism, supra note 119, at 174-76.
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out international obligations, although some have sought to do so by estab-
lishing organs for their international representation. 126
The greatest disparity between the Soviet treatment of ethnic minorities
and Union Republics and its obligations tinder international law is found in
its failure to grant either the minorities or the Republics the right of self-
determination. 127 This right as embodied in article 1 of the U.N. Cove-
nants provides that all people are free to determine their political status and
pursue their own economic, social, and cultural development. One commen-
tator regards this right as applicable "to all people of a certain amount of
population forming an ethnical unit and living in a common territory." 128
Based on this interpretation, he argues that article 1 of the U.N. Covenants
should be considered indispensible to the enjoyment of all other rights pro-
vided for by the Covenants, and consequently that the right of self-
determination should be granted to national minorities. 129 Soviet minorities
also should benefit from internally guaranteed "collective" human rights as
members of the Soviet population as a whole. Because all Soviet citizens are
126. Uibopuu, Personality, supra note 123, at 831, 842. For example, the Ukrainian and
Byelorussian S.S.R. have sought to assume international obligations by virtue of membership in
various international organs. Id. at 832. They also have entered into multilateral treaties, but
have never become parties before the U.S.S.R. This fact reflects the Soviet Union's right to
determine basic foreign policies of the Union Republics. Id. at 835. In any event, the other
Union Republics have to date concluded very few international treaties and are members only
in a few international nongovernmental organizations. They are thus not on the same legal
footing as the Ukraine and Byelorussia, which themselves are only limited international legal
persons, mainly by virtue of their membership in the U.N. Id. at 842-43. The capacity to carry
out international obligations results from the combined factors of government and indepen-
dence. A government must not only have the power to accept such obligations, but no other
entity must carry out or accept this responsibility for it. If the lack of independence is complete,
the entity concerned is not a state at all, but internationally an indistinguishable part of a
dominant state. Therefore, because the Union Republics cannot be considered territorial en-
tities and because they lack the actual power to enter into relations with other states, they fall
short of meeting the criteria for statehood in international law. See Crawford, supra note 28, at
119-20, 139.
127. See note 28 and accompanying text supra. The .Union Republics might well exercise the
right of self-determination by freely choosing to remain within the Soviet federation, but be-
cause of the limited enjoyment of this right, an accurate assessment of the Union Republics'
voluntary commitments to federation cannot be made. Although article 29 of the Constitution
adopts the concept that international law governs the relations between the U.S.S.R. and other
nations, it does not refer to the right of self-determination, but only vaguely mentions the right
of peoples to determine their own fate.
128. Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 44, at 224. An alternative interpretation is that the
right of self-determination applies primarily to people under colonial and other forms of alien
subjugation, domination, or exploitation. This is the prevailing U.N. practice. Id. at 225.
Likewise the U.S.S.R. has argued that the U.N. Covenants apply only to colonial peoples, but
as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act, which serves as an auxiliary interpretative device, the
Soviet Union could be estopped from unilaterally interpreting self-determination only in favor of
colonial peoples. Also, both U.N. Covenants' provisions must be determined by the practices of
all states. Id. See generally Crawford, supra note 44, at 150-52.
129. Uibopuu, Minorities, supra note 28, at 150-52.
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entitled to the human rights embodied in the U.N. Covenants and other
international instruments, it follows that Soviet minorities should be equally
entitled.
The main participants in the conduct of public affairs, however, including
the free determination of political, economic, and cultural rights, are those
who serve as government officials and Party members. 130 Thus, both the
majority of the Soviet people and the ethnic minorities encompassed therein
are denied full enjoyment of these indispensible rights. This stark reality is
antithetical to the ideals of Marx and Lenin, who envisaged control of the
State by the wisest during society's evolution to Communism, but never
contemplated the mastery of one nationality over all others.131 The quest for
centralized federal dominion likewise inspires the State to reject the princi-
ple, thought to be fundamental, that the Soviet Union should consist of a
federation of juridically equal nationalities. 132 It is disingenuous of the
U.S.S.R. to represent to the world community respect for the right of self-
determination when in practice this right is ignored within the U.S.S.R.
b. The Legal Status of Aliens
Aliens are perhaps the least visible minority within the Soviet legal sys-
tem, but they are recognized under Soviet law, and thus acquire both rights
and duties. Article 37 of the Constitution guarantees aliens certain rights and
freedoms provided by law, including recourse to the courts and other gov-
ernmental bodies. These basic civil rights also are protected by the U.S.S.R.
Civil Code, except where exercise of the rights would contradict the pur-
poses of Socialist society. 133 The Civil Code extends these rights to aliens
by granting them legal capacity equal to that of Soviet citizens. Significantly,
however, the rights of aliens are subject to the power of the federal govern-
ment to impose restrictions by law. 134 Additionally, while the Civil Code
provides that rules established under treaties or other international agree-
ments shall apply to aliens, these rights can be preempted by Soviet civil
legislation or the legislation of a Union Republic. 135 As a practical matter,
130. HOUGH, supra note 4, at 362-63.
131. See notes 5-6 supra.
132. See THE SOVIET STATE AND LA\V, supra note 105, at 90-91.
133. Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, arts. 5, 6 in
SAIFULIN, supra note 74, at 153-54 [hereinafter cited as USSR Civil Code]. It appears that
article 5 may be used to either support or deny the participation of the Soviet government,
including the judiciary, in the protection of the civil rights of aliens where the exercise of these
rights either conforms or conflicts with Socialist purposes. Comment, The Civil and Political
Rights of Aliens in the U.S.S.R.: A Survey of Soviet Legislation, 11 TEX. INTL L. J. 571, 577
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Rights of Aliens]. Moreover, the Civil Code extends to aliens the
constitutional rights of free speech, press, assembly and street processions to the degree that
the exercise of these rights does not threaten or offend the State. Id. at 592. See USSR Civil
Code, supra, art. 122.
134. USSR Civil Code, supra note 133, art. 122.
135. Id. art. 129.
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therefore, the Soviet system is potentially as harsh for aliens as for other
minorities, despite the apparent liberality of the Civil Code. 13' The Sit-
preme Soviet, as the preeminent legislative body, 137 is unwilling to submit
to foreign interpretation of its international obligations with respect to aliens
or to permit judicial control over legislation. 138 Such a concession obviously
would entail weakening the Soviet government's sovereignty over domestic
affairs. 139 The treatment of aliens is, therefore, fundamentally consistent
with the treatment of other minorities.
The power of the Soviet Union to restrict the scope of alien rights limits
the extent to which internationally recognized civil rights expressed as
human rights apply to aliens in the U.S.S.R. Under international law the
rights of aliens are protected by article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, which provides that all individuals within the territories of the
contracting parties and subject to their jurisdiction are to enjoy the rights
embodied in the Covenant without distinction of any kind. Article 2 will
have slight significance for aliens in the U.S.S.R. until the rights of Soviet
citizens are fully implemented and until the Soviet government recognizes
the accepted international standard forbidding the unilateral interpretation of
human rights principles. 140
In summary, world opinion must be drawn to the plight of Soviet
minorities and to the fictional sovereignty of the Union Republics.1 4 1 Failure
to do so will mean continued disregard for minorities' rights and nominal inde-
pendence for the Republics. Faced with these prospects, it is necessary that
the world community employ all available mechanisms to force greater
Soviet compliance with its human rights obligations.
Treatment of Dissidents
The term "dissident" can be broadly defined to encompass those individu-
als whom the Soviet government officially regards as actively resistant to the
136. The Soviet civil codes contain general provisions concerning the procedural rights of
aliens and stateless persons created by the application of the civil law of foreign countries,
decisions of international courts and international treaties and agreements. In particular, these
provisions embody treaty principles and international law. USSR Civil Code, supra note 133,
art. 129; Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the USSR an(l the Union Republics, art. 64 [here-
inafter cited as USSR Civil Procedure] in SAIFULIN, supra note 74, at 231. Thus, these articles
constitute statutory recognition by the Soviet Union of international obligations with respect to
aliens within Soviet territory. Blishchenko, supra note 12, at 822.
137. See note 4 supra.
138. See DAVID, supra note 5, at 211, 243-44.
139. See Hazard, Tactics, supra note 15, at 28. By limiting the capacity of aliens to that of
Soviet Citizens, the Supreme Soviet seeks to prevent, by means of the USSR Civil Code, supra
note 133, art. 122, the intrusion of any foreign minimum standards of civil rights and thereby to
protect Soviet government sovereignty. Rights of Aliens, supra note 133, at 579-80.
140. See note 12 supra.
141. See notes 212-215 and accompanying text infra.
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security and implementation of the Communist Party's policies. 142 Con-
temporary practices designed to repress dissent include "dissidents' clauses,"
other vague provisions of the criminal codes, closed, unpublicized trials,
employment discrimination, psychiatric confinement, and abuse of peniten-
tiary law. In many instances, these practices do not involve a breach of
Soviet domestic law, but they nevertheless constitute violations of human
rights.
a. Vague Statutory Provisions and Secret Trials
Although the overriding principle of legality -nulluin crimen, nulla poena
sine lege-was formally introduced into the Soviet legal system with the
legislative reform of 1958, 143 the special provisions of many criminal codes
remain so vague as to permit a finding of criminal liability for practically any
conduct regarded by the authorities as socially dangerous. One example is
the prohibition against anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, the so-called
"dissidents' clause," 14" used to repress political opposition. The government
142. This definition serves to identify a trait common to all individuals whose human rights
are violated as a result of their insistence that the Soviet government live up to its legal obliga-
tions. Oppression of dissents is one means of manipulating the Soviet legal system to gain
universal conformity without inspiring the overt terror of the Stalinist era. Defining "dissident"
in this way also obviates the problem of identifying the Party's unofficial attitude toward an
individual, as well as the motivation for his or her alleged illegal activities. Because of the
secrecy which often surrounds the trial and imprisonment of dissidents, this information is dif-
ficult to ascertain from outside sources. See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra.
143. See generally Bassiouni, The Criminal Justice System of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the People's Republic of China, 11 REVISTA DE DERECHO PuERTORRIQUENO 164
(1971) (arguing that the principle of legality was weakly embodied).
144. RSFSR Criminal Code, supra, note 83, art. 70. The intention on the part of the accused
to weaken or subvert the Soviet regime is an essential element of this crime. Thus, an indi-
vidual who collects and maintains material which is anti-Soviet in nature but who has no wish to
disseminate this information-for example, by merely keeping a diary-is not guilty of a viola-
tion of Article 70. Additional to an intention to weaken the Soviet state, the offense also re-
quires that the material in question be anti-Soviet in substance. To the western lawyer, Article
70 appears to conflict with the free speech provision of Article 50 of the Constitution. Soviet
jurists respond by noting that the exercise of free speech, as stated in Article 50, must be "[i]n
accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist
system ...." Freedom of speech thus is not an absolute right under Soviet law, but must yield
when the "interests of the people" or the "socialist system" is found to outweigh it. It may be
argued, however, that these interests are advanced by encouraging, rather than repressing, free
speech. Further examination reveals a second weakness of Article 70, its vagueness and over-
breadth. Given its present formulation and that of Article 50 of the Constitution, it is unclear
when speech unfavorable toward the Soviet state, whether by word of mouth, in print, or
through artistic expression, is constitutionally protected. Article 70 also requires investigative
bodies to inquire into the personality and moral philosophy of persons accused thereunder in
order to determine if the intent requirement is satisfied. This procedure seems to invite a
return to the concept of guilt by association, which has been discredited in the Soviet system.
For these reasons, Article 70 is well suited to the repression of dissent in the Soviet Union. See
Osakwe, Analysis, suprq note 55, at 465-67.
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also uses special decrees (postanovlenia)145 to amend criminal codes, with
the result that subsequently imposed penalties may be harsher than those
prescribed at the time of the offense, or that authorities may be acting in
what previously would have been an illegal or extra-legal manner. 146
Another vaguely worded enactment invoked against dissidents, especially
between 1957 and 1970, is the so-called anti-parasite legislation. 147 This
law has been interpreted by the Presidium of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme
Soviet to include as "parasites": (1) those who do not honestly work accord-
ing to their abilities, or obtain unearned income, or are guilty of anti-social
acts, and (2) those who take jobs in enterprises, offices, or on kolkhozy (col-
lective farms) only for the sake of appearances, while in fact leading a parasi-
tic way of life. 148 Before 1965, the penalty for this crime was expulsion to
specially designated places for a term of two to five years with the obligation
to work at such localities and to forfeit "unearned property." The legal stan-
dards for "parasitism" were relaxed in 1965, but the crime remains punish-
able by expulsion and resettlement. Also, as a consequence of classification as
an administrative offense, this charge carries no right of appeal, 149 which
further opens the way for arbitrariness and abuse. Hundreds of innocent
people have been administratively sentenced for political reasons to the
harsh punishment of exile for a crime of dubious legal validity. 150
145. See generally Vanneman, supra note 6, at 286, 291.
146. One egregious example of the latter involved the trials of several people, three of whom
were Jews. The indictment charged that the defendants engaged in the illegal buying and sell-
ing of foreign currency and gold coins, which was a source of unearned income and furthered
the unlawful export of Soviet money and foreign currencies as well as the development of
smuggling and speculation in goods. Grzybowski, Uncensored, supra note 116, at 313-14. These
alleged activities, defined as crimes against the state, violated article 88 of the RSFSR Criminal
Code, supra note 82. Defendants were originally sentenced to prison, but not content with this,
the authorities changed the law, and the case was tried by the Supreme Court of the
R.S.F.S.R. Meanwhile the law on crimes against the state was amended to permit the death
penalty for violations of foreign currency laws. See RSFSR Criminal Code, supra note 82, art.
23. Two defendants were subsequently sentenced to death. Thus, the defendants were not tried
under the law in force at the time of the alleged offenses, despite the imperative of the nonret-
roactivity principle in Soviet law, See USSR Judicial Legislation, supra note 83, art. 6; USSR
Criminal Procedure, supra note 83, art. 4. Grzybowski, Uncensored, supra note 116, at 315.
Moreover, the appeal to the Supreme Court was illegal since such cassational appeals are in-
tended by law to be a verification of the legality of the lower court's judgment and not a de
novo review. Indeed, the Supreme Court's function is to determine only whether the decision
was clearly erroneous in light of the materials presented at trial. RSFSR Criminal Procedure,
supra note 82, art. 332. See also Osakwe, Due Process, supra note 1, at 291-92. Clearly the trial
of these defendants by the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Court was a trial de novo and illegal under
Soviet law.
147. RSFSR Criminal Code, supra note 82, art. 209; Lapenna, supra note 58, at 88.
148. BERMAN, supra note 82, at 9-11.
149. Lapenna, supra note 58, at 88.
150. Id. at 89.
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Another vaguely defined crime is hooliganism. As set forth, this crime is
an act that constitutes a rude disruption of public order and that manifests a
clear disrespect toward society. 151 Because this provision allows so many
acts to be legally interpreted as offenses, it has become a device that enables
law enforcement officials to treat anyone whom they regard as politically or
socially dangerous as a criminal offender while preserving the appearance of
legality. The provision also enables the authorities to treat as serious offend-
ers those individuals whom they have apprehended incidentally, although
the original offenses may have been insignificant or nonexistent. 152
Law enforcement officials are frequently compelled directly by Party au-
thorities or through the KGB to deal with political dissidents as if they were
ordinary criminals, with the result that control of the legal process in these
cases rests with the Party or its agents and not with law enforcement agen-
cies. 153 This practice conflicts with the function of the prokuratura, the
branch of the Soviet legal profession that oversees the strict and uniform
observance of the law in all spheres of Soviet public and social life. 154
Moreover, such discriminatory inteference with legal processes violates the
equal rights provision of the Soviet Constitution (article 34) as well as article
57, which obligates all public officials to protect the rights and freedoms of all
citizens.
The courts have taken a similarly active role in suppressing dissent by
assessing the circumstances aggravating criminal responsibility in the cases of
dissidents. 155 Courts may consider "other base motives" in determining the
accused's degree of responsibility, but like the vague statutory provisions
already discussed, this allows for liberal interpretation. One commentator
has attempted to define such motives as those "incompatible with communist
151. See RSFSR Criminal Code, supra note 82, art. 206. This article has been used to cover
a wide variety of offenses despite the "relatively clear definition of hooliganism." Lapenna,
supra note 58, at 79.
152. Shtromas, supra note 53, at 302-03. One example is the case of Igumenov, who was
convicted of hooliganism and imprisoned for three years even though he was probably guilty of
the lesser offense of intentional infliction of light bodily injury. Lapenna, supra note 58, at 79.
In response to widespread "deviation" by the courts, however, a decree (postanovlenie) of the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Court in 1974 called for continued struggle against hooliganism, but at the
same time instructed the courts to consider all the circumstances of the offense as well as the
character of the accused. The courts also were asked to consider the possibility of conditional
sentences and of educating the offender without applying the administrative penalty of deten-
tion. Id. at 80. Thus, the Soviet Union may be increasingly inclined to show more restraint in
bringing the charge of hooliganism. Id.
153. Shtromas, supra note 53, at 307.
154. CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. 164. One of the principal functions of the prokura-
tura is to take charge of preliminary criminal investigations. This initial step is taken in order to
detect crimes, expose the guilty, ascertain the relevant circumstances of the case, and take
crime prevention measures. V. TEREBILOV, THE SOVIET COURT 69-74 (1973). See generally
Savitski, Institutions for the Administration of Criminal Justice, in BASSIOUNI & SAVmTSKI,
supra note 7, at 3, 16-29; Barry, supra note 85, at 24-26.
155. See USSR Criminal Legislation, supra note 93, art. 34; RSFSR Criminal Code, supra
note 82, art. 39.
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morality." This definition is subject to broad interpretation, however, accord-
ing to a given court's notion of what it considers to be "incompatible." ' 156
In addition, trials of dissidents may be conducted in secret by packing the
courtroom with KGB agents or militia. 157 This practice violates the re-
quirement of Soviet law that, except in certain types of cases, trials be
open. 158 Moreover, freedom of expression and of the press may be cur-
tailed, in violation of article 50 of the Constitution, when authorities prevent
the publication of information in the trials of dissidents. The usual technique
is to prevent publicity about trials and to publish instead objective reports of
tried cases. Information does emerge, however, in the form of sanizdat
(self-published, uncensored) literature, and this source provides evidence
that in all politically sensitive cases, guarantees of fairness and legality are
ignored. 159
Specific protection for the human rights of dissidents is found primarily in
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The practice of Party authorities
and the KGB in dealing directly with dissidents outside of the judicial proc-
ess is inconsistent with article 14(1), which ensures accused persons a fair
hearing. This conduct also Violates article 26, which guarantees equal treat-
ment before the law to all people, and article 2(3)(a), which ensures an effec-
tive remedy to any person whose rights under the Covenant have been vio-
lated, including violations resulting from the illegal acts of persons acting in
an official capacity. Fairness, equal treatment, and effective remedy cannot
be guaranteed where the Party or the KGB takes charge of a case in order to
produce an outcome favorable to Party interests.
The flexible application of vague statutory provisions (dissidents' clauses,
anti-parasitism, hooliganism) and the consideration of "other base motives"
conflict with article 14(3)(a) of the Covenant, which requires that anyone
accused of a crime be informed in detail of the nature and cause of the
charge. An individual accused of violating such vague statutes is unlikely to
comprehend the criminal nature of his or her conduct, further impairing the
right to prepare an adequate defense under article 14(3)(b) and (d). Further,
the use of special decrees by the Supreme Soviet and lesser state organs is
contrary to the nonretroactivity doctrine embodied in article 15. This article
states that no one may be found guilty of any act or omission that did not
constitute a crime when the questioned conduct occurred and that a heavier
penalty may not be imposed than the one applicable at the time of the
156. See Osakwe, Analysis, supra note 55, at 462-63.
157. Grzybowski, Uncensored, supra note 116, at 305-06.
158. USSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82, art. 12. The general rule in Soviet procedure
provides for public trials, but the law recognizes exceptions, particularly for sex crimes, crimes
committed by persons under sixteen years of age, and cases involving intimate personal secrets.
Closed trials also are held in cases involving state secrets, but the judgments of the courts must
be publicly announced. Savitski, Criminal Procedure in BASSIOUNI & SAVITSKI, supra note 7, at
45, 51.
159. Grzybowski, Uncensored, supra note 116, at 305.
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offense. Finally, the public hearing provision of article 14(1) requires that
the accused be allowed to present his or her case before a "competent, in-
dependent and impartial tribunal established by law." To bar public attend-
ance and to prevent release of information in trials of dissidents is to com-
promise the objectivity of the court. When pressured to produce the result
that the State expects, courts established and regulated by law become
crude instruments of political power.
Irrespective of these violations of international law, the use of vague stat-
utes and extra-judicial means to repress dissent frustrates the goals of
Socialist justice. 160 Confusion is introduced into the legal process through
statutes that fail to define offenses clearly, and by reliance on political au-
thority whenever the judicial system is deemed inadequate to produce out-
comes desirable to the State. This element of unpredictability contradicts the
long-declared intention of the Soviet government to place increasing em-
phasis on the rule of law 161 and perniciously undermines the need for order
in an increasingly complex society. A legal system that does not offer
consistent standards cannot keep pace with those developments. Indeed, the
means chosen to repress dissent in the Soviet Union are likely to retard
progress toward Communism by bringing disorder into the intermediate
stage of the Soviet Union's transformation. Thus, even the modest advances
in human rights achieved in the U.S.S.R. may be negated so that the State's
grip on power will not be weakened.
b. Discrimination in Employment
Government officals have repeatedly utilized the mechanisms of Soviet
labor law to deny employment to dissidents. 162 The scope and variety of
these repressive labor practices is very broad. Indeed, Soviet lawmakers
have devised means to deny protection against unfair dismissal to increas-
ingly numerous categories of workers whose political loyalties may be ques-
tioned. 163 Additionally, the employment status of domestic personnel (per-
160. See note 7 supra. The penal practice in the -Soviet Union has been directed at the
"over-policing" of political activity but "'under-policing" of general delinquency. The former is
due to continuing governmental focus on dissent, while the latter has resulted in the failure to
properly protect Soviet citizens from crimes against their personal safety, property, and indi-
vidual rights. Shtromas, supra note 53, at 314.
161. See Osakwe, Due Process, supra note 1, at 270. Cf. Lapenna, supra note 58, at 77
(arguing that despite the improvement in the Soviet legal system through codification, deficien-
cies remain due to lack of a code of administrative procedure and inadequate formulation of
legal standards in the field of substantive criminal law).
162. van den Berg, The Right to Work and Politically Motivated Discrimination in Soviet
Labor Law, 5 REv. SOCIALIST L. 251, 253 (1979) [hereinafter cited as van den Berg].
163. Id. at 295.
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sons "working for citizens under contract") remains unclear, thereby expos-
ing dissidents who work in this capacity to prosecution for parasitism on the
grounds that they lack permanent employment. 164
Discriminatory labor practices also occur in attestation proceedings, which
are used to determine the employment fitness of certain scientific personnel,
teachers, and all high-ranking persons in the economy. Fitness for employ-
ment typically is based on political criteria such as Party membership and
participation in political and educational work. 165 Entry into higher educa-
tional and managerial positions is controlled by the High Attestation Com-
mission (HAG) which oversees the granting and deprivation of academic de-
grees and titles. HAC has the authority to deprive a kandidat of a degree or
title on political grounds alone, which occurs frequently in the cases of dissi-
dents and of Jews wishing to emigrate. 166 The academic community also
relies on faculty or university councils to block the rehiring or reelection of
"undesirable" teaching staff. Ideology and political training are factors
considered in reaching these employment decisions. Frequently, dissidents
who fail to be reelected find it nearly impossible to acquire new positions in
their chosen professions. 167 These difficulties arise due to the requirement
that a notebook recording dismissal for lack of fitness must be presented to
prospective employers. 168
Soviet law provides that upon dismissal employees can appeal to higher
agencies or to the prokuratura. Given the tendency of these institutions to
side with management, 169 however, this appeal has proved to be a largely
useless act. The courts are inclined to restrict the inquiry to the mere for-
malities of the dismissal procedure and generally ignore the employee's as-
sertion that the actual grounds for dismissal were political. 170
The use of political criteria for the purpose of employment discrimination
is evidence of a Party policy to win the unquestioned loyalty of employees
with the concommitant threat of dismissal for disloyalty. 171 To enforce this
164. Employment status is difficult to determine in some cases because trade unions may
refuse to accept the registration of an employment contract by an employer. If that occurs, no
contract exists, and the way is clear for prosecution for parasitism. Id. at 262-63. See generally
notes 147-150 and accompanying text supra.
165. van den Berg, supra note 162, at 270. The CPSU is represented in attestation commis-
sions. Its viewpoint is not formally decisive, but the political focus of those proceedings in-
creases the influence of the Party representative's vote in the outcome. The result of attestation
hearings is a decision on the fitness of an employee for a particular position; this serves only as a
recommendation to the employer. Id. at 273-74. Dismissal resulting from an attestation hearing
is appealable in the courts, and conclusions of the attestation commission are only one source of
evidence. In theory, this rule offers employees some protection from political discrimination,
but it is unlikely that the courts have applied it where employees were dismissed for their
political views. Id. at 275.
166. Id. at 276-77.
167. Id. at 287.
168. Id. at 292.
169. Id. at 284.
t70. Id. at 294.
171. The CONsTI'ruiON, supra note 2, art. 34, which provides for equality of Soviet citizens
"in all fields of economic, political, social and cultural life", is conspicuous in its omission of an
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policy, pressure is exerted on employers to dismiss dissident employees. 172
Employment discrimination against dissidents conflicts with Soviet obliga-
tions under article 4 of the International Labor Organization Convention on
employment discrimination, 173 which provides for the right of a dismissed
employee to appeal the dismissal to an independent "competent body." The
Soviet practices also conflict with various provisions of the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The nondiscrimination clause of arti-
cle 2(2) provides that the rights guaranteed under the Convention shall apply
without regard to political opinion. In particular, every person has the right
to work at a freely-chosen occupation (article 6(2)) and to be given an equal
opportunity to be promoted in a chosen occupation subject only to consider-
ations of seniority and competence (article 7(c)).
The policy underlying these enumerated rights is the elimination of job
discrimination based on political belief, yet the Soviet Union only recognizes
political belief which conforms to that of the CPSU. Non-dissident Soviet
workers' employment is secured by Soviet domestic law, and such
employees do not require the additional protection of these conventions.
Only dissident employees stand to benefit from the protection of interna-
tional law, but it is precisely this group that is denied these rights. In short,
the Soviet Union's ratification of the fair employment provisions of these
conventions is nothing more than a hollow gesture creating a paper right.
c. Psychiatric Confinement
Perhaps the most disturbing human rights violation in the Soviet Union is
the silencing of dissent through unlawful psychiatric confinement. This de-
vice is both pervasive 1 74 and effective while not formally violative of the
criminal law. The first step toward confinement 1 75 takes place when officials
anti-discrimination in employment clause. Thus, this article adds nothing to the anti-
discrimination protections in labor law. This omission as a constitutional standard suggests that
the CPSU intended to enforce a policy of unquestioned political loyalty among certain
categories of employees.
172. van den Berg, supra note 162, at 296.
173. See note 77 supra.
174. Although only a few names are known, it is estimated that individuals confined in this
manner number in the thousands. Yeo, Psychiatry, the Law and Dissent in the Soviet Union, 14
REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 34, 41 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yeo]. This device has been used
not only against dissidents, but also against Ukrainian nationalists, Baptists, Jews and others.
Lapenna, supra note 58, at 84.
175. For a detailed discussion of the steps involved in the psychiatric confinement process
and the legislation on which this is based, see Young-Anawaty, International Human Rights
Norms and Soviet Abuse of Psychiatry, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 785, 790-800 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Young-Anawaty]. See also Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment:
An International Human Rights Issue, 9 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 629, 636-45 (1979). For accounts
of the experiences of dissidents who were psychiatrically confined, see generally H. FIRESIDE,
SOVIET PSYCHOPRISONS (1979) [hereinafter cited as FIRESIDE]; A. PODRABINEK, PUNTIVE
MEDICINE (1977). As a result of his study on psychiatric confinement in the U.S.S.R., Pod-
rabinek was sentenced by the Moscow Regional Court to five years' exile under article 190-1 of
the RSFSR Criminal Code "for fabrications, damaging to the Soviet state and social system."
Amnesty International, The Podrabinek Trial: Punitive Medicine or Fabrications Known to be
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investigating a criminal case question the mental health of the accused. 176
They may then request a psychiatric diagnosis of the accused by a psychiat-
ric commission. If the commission finds that the defendant is suffering from
a mental illness or was mentally incapacitated at the time the alleged crime
was committed, criminal proceedings must be suspended and the diagnosis
presented to a court. The court then decides if the accused must be confined
on a compulsory basis for medical reasons. 177 Throughout this process the
individual is deprived of all procedural rights established by Soviet law for
persons charged with committing crimes. 178 If the court finds that the ac-
cused was correctly determined by the psychiatric commission to be men-
tally ill at the time of the alleged offense, it releases the accused from crimi-
nal responsibility or punishment 179 and may order commitment for medical
treatment. 18o The defendant then will be sent either to an ordinary
psychiatric hospital if not considered socially dangerous, or to a "special"
psychiatric hospital reserved for persons who "represent a special danger for
society."'' Once in a psychiatric hospital, inmates have no procedural
means of protesting treatment and conditions. Furthermore, neither patients
nor their relatives have a voice in choosing the attending psychiatrist, the
methods of treatment, or even the right to see medical reports. Changes in
political views are closely observed by a psychiatrist, and inmates may be
False. . . ? I (British Section, Tower House, 8/14 Southhampton Street, London WC2E 7HF).
See note 83 supra.
176. See RSFSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82, art. 184.
177. RSFSR Criminal Code, supra note 82, arts. 58, 59; RSFSR Criminal Procedure, supra
note 82, art. 188. Although Soviet courts are intended to be autonomous, in cases with political
overtones they revert to the political role for which they were created in the Stalinist era. Yeo,
supra note 174, at 38.
178. Yeo, supra note 174, at 35. An accused whose sanity is questioned need be told neither
that an order for examination has been issued nor the results of the examination. The investiga-
tion officials are not required to inform the accused of new charges or of documentation in the
case. It is also in the court's discretion whether the accused and/or his or her relatives can
attend the court hearing regarding sanity and confinement, and the date of the hearing need not
be disclosed. Finally, a public hearing is not required in many Union Republics, such as the
Russian Republic. id.
One example of the arbitrariness of this procedure is the case of Yakhimovich, a Communist
official highly praised as a collective farm chairman until "he began spreading slanderous and
defamatory statements blaming the Soviet government and social system." Nothing abnormal
could be discovered about Yakhimovich's behavior, except for his political dissidence. Neverthe-
less, he was found to show "development of a paranoid system in a psychopathic personality,"
and was confined to a mental hospital. Young-Anawaty, supra note 175, at 807, n.86.
179. RSFSR Criminal Code, supra note 82, art. 11. In so doing, the courts are purporting to
apply the rules of nonimputability to these individuals who at the time they committed "socially
dangerous" acts did not realize the significance of their acts nor correctly govern their conduct
because of mental illness. Lapenna, supra note 58, at 84. See also Osakwe, Analysis, supra note
55, at 451-53.
180. RSFSR Criminal Procedure, supra note 82, art. 410. See Young-Anawaty, supra note
175, at 795-96.
181. RSFSR Criminal Code, supra note 82, arts. 59 & 60. See Young-Anawaty, supra note
175, at 39-40.
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pronounced "cured" only when they reject their dissident views and agree to
conform. 182
The psychiatric confinement of dissidents violates numerous internation-
ally protected human rights. This practice also evidences the Soviet Union's
failure to live up to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of promoting and
encouraging the effective exercise of civil and political rights. 183 In particu-
lar, abuses in the psychiatric treatment of dissidents eviscerates significant
guarantees under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the
right to liberty and security of person (article 9(1)), the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion (article 18), and the right to hold opinions
without interference (article 19). It also endorses disrespect for the prohibi-
tion against torture' 8 4 and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment (article 7). These practices leave little force and effect in the
government's obligation to treat all persons with humanity and respect (arti-
cle 10(1)).
No one can seriously maintain that the punctilious legal proceedings lead-
ing to psychiatric confinement are intended to provide humane treatment for
embattled dissidents. Indeed, the State protects itself by creating a smoke-
screen for the secret character of such hearings. 185 If protest against the
Soviet system is, in fact, a form of mental illness, the State should not fear
the public expression of dissidents' views. Party officials who justify their
authority on the grounds of a higher consciousness of society's needs
186
should welcome the opportunity to enlarge public understanding through
open dispute with dissidents. Such debate should readily expose the
purportedly misguided views of dissidents, show them not to be socially
dangerous, and make them amenable to reeducation. The fact that criticism
is stifled through psychiatric confinement carries the opposite implication-
that dissidents may spread their just discontent to others. The underlying
reason for psychiatric confinement may, therefore, be to conceal deficiencies
182. Yeo, supra note 174, at 39-40.
183. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra. From May 24 to June 1, 1980, a commit-
tee of experts sponsored by the International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences,
Siracusa, Sicily, considered a Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of Persons Suffering
from Mental Disorder. When drafting is completed, this document will be presented to the
United Nations for adoption. Information can be obtained from the International Commission of
Jurists, P.O. Box 120, 109 Route de Chine, 1224 Ch~ne-Bougeries, Geneva, Switzerland.
184. Torture has been defined as conduct on the part of a public official by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inflicted on the victim either to obtain a confession
or to intimidate, discredit or humiliate, or as a form of unlawful punishment. Unlawful psychiat-
ric confinement as practiced in the Soviet Union falls within the scope of this definition and is
accordingly prohibited. See Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture,
February 1, 1978, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/NGO 213. For a discussion of the historical use of
torture as a device to suppress political opposition, see generally Bassiouni, An Appraisal of
Torture in International Law and Practice: The Need for an International Convention for the
Prevention and Suppression of Torture, 48 REVUE INTLE DE DROIT PENAL 29-31 (1977).
185. Yeo, supra note 174, at 35.
186. See note 5 supra.
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in the socialist system. In any event, the issue of freely expressed disagree-
ment with the State is itself foreclosed from public scrutiny. Far from acting
consistently with official doctrine, the Soviet government deems it necessary
to send thousands through legitimatized procedures to these gas chambers of
the human spirit. 187
d. Conditions of Imprisonment
Equally abhorrent as the human rights violations associated with psychiat-
ric confinement are those which result from the conditions of imprisonment.
The treatment of dissident prisoners is governed primarily by the Principles
of Corrective Labour Legislation' 88 and by the Corrective Labor Codes that
are based on these Principles. 189 In addition, the Rules of Internal Order
further strengthen federal control over the actual operation of the peniten-
tiary system. 190 These rules have not been published, but originate, with
doubtful legal validity according to one commentator, in article 5 of the Cor-
rective Labour Legislation. 191
Under Soviet penitentiary law, the Soviet Ministry of Interior has author-
ity to locate those serious offenders entrusted to the Ministry, particularly
political prisoners, in prison facilities. Special hardship falls on political pris-
oners from smaller Union Republics who may be placed thousands of miles
away from their homeland in Russian or Siberian camps among predomi-
nantly Russian camp populations. 192
Evidence in samizdat literature indicates that prison camp administrators
do not comply with laws intended to govern their conduct. Although prison
officials attempt to justify maltreatment of prisoners mainly by asserting that
it is permitted under the Rules of Internal Order, such treatment, as one
commentator states, "is characterized by systematic cruelty and by brutal-
ization, intimidation and humiliation of prisoners, in particular political pris-
oners." 193  The purpose of these abuses, in the extreme, is "to make life
literally impossible" for dissident prisoners. 194 Clearly, this approach to
penology is incompatible with the present official program of the CPSU to
replace eventually all forms of criminal punishment with resocialization and
educational measures. 195
187. See FIRESIDE, supra note 175, at 11.
188. See Fundamentals of Corrective Labour Legislation of the USSR and the Union Repub-
lics [hereinafter cited as Corrective Labour Legislation] in SAIFULIN, supra note 74, at 301. See
generally Shupilov, Execution of Sentences in BASSIOUNI & SAVITSKI, supra note 7, at 177-99
[hereinafter cited as Shupilov].
189. See Feldbrugge, Soviet Penitentiary Law, I REv. SOCIALIST L. 123 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Feldbrugge, Penitentiary].
190. Id. at 129.
191. See note 188 supra; Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 129.
192. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 129.
193. Id. at 132.
194. Id.
195. See Corrective Labour Legislation, supra note 188, art. 1; RSFSR Criminal Code, supra
note 82, art. 20. See also Shupilov, supra note 188 at 180.
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One of the most frequently reported abuses is the imposition of unreason-
able or excessively severe 196 penalties by prison authorities. There also are
reports that work assignments to prisoners violate the laws governing the
protection of health and labor safety. 197 In addition, incoming correspon-
dence to prisoners is censored despite their right to receive letters without
any apparent restriction on number. 198 Prison censorship officials obviously
assume authority to withhold letters deemed to have a "negative influence"
on prisoners. 19:1 Moreover, the number of letters prisoners can send out is
carefully controlled. 200 Political prisoners, for example, are allowed to send
only one letter per month. 201 Thus, despite the protection of Soviet law,
the right to correspondence is quite accurately described by sarnizdat re-
ports as drastically curtailed or reduced to nothing. 202
Even greater restrictions are imposed on the right of prisoners to receive
visits of long and short duration, for cancellation of visits is one of the most
frequently applied disciplinary measures. Further, while the Corrective
Labour Legislation 20 3 permits prisoners to order books and periodicals pub-
lished in the U.S.S.R. within certain limitations, 20 4 the Rules of Internal
Order effectively penalize prisoners by prescribing a more restrictive list of
articles and goods which they may possess. 205 Thus, the Corrective Labour
196. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 188, at 133. The range and severity of penalties
that can be imposed on persons deprived of liberty is governed by Corrective Labour Legisla-
tion, supra note 188, art. 34.
197. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 133. The labor conditions for persons
serving prison sentences are governed by Corrective Labour Legislation, supra note 188, art.
28. These include an eight-hour work day six days a week, release from work on holidays, and
observance of safety rules as provided for by the labor laws. Id.
198. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 133. The Corrective Labour Code permits
censorship of "prisoners' correspondence" and is interpreted to include incoming mail. Id. This
practice appears to conflict with Corrective Labour Legislation, supra note 188, art. 26, which
provides that "[c]onvicted persons shall be allowed to receive letters without restriction."
199. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 133.
200. See Corrective Labour Legislation, supra note 188, art. 26.
201. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 133.
202. Id.
203. Id. The right to receive visits is provided under Corrective Labour Legislation, supra
note 188, art. 24. This article provides for brief or prolonged visits in varying numbers depend-
ing on the regimen imposed on the convict by the sentence. It also provides for additional visits
for "good behavior and a conscientious attitude to work." Id. Samizdat reports suggest, how-
ever, that procedures for visitation are instituted which are intended to harass visitors or to be
invoked as a pretext for not admitting them. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 133.
Cf. Corrective Labour Legislation, supra note 188, art. 34 (providing for deprivation of a regu-
lar visit as a disciplinary measure).
204. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 134. Corrective Labour Legislation, supra
note 188, art. 25 provides that "convicted persons shall be allowed to receive not more than two
parcels of printed matter a year and also to buy literature through the book trading network
without restriction." Nevertheless, intense disagreements have arisen between prison personnel
and Baptist prisoners who attach great importance to possession and reading of the Bible.
Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 134.
205. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 134.
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Legislation could permit possession of certain items which the list neverthe-
less forbids. Officials who base their authority on the list thereby violate the
higher norm of the Corrective Labour Legislation.
Samizdat literature also has reported that prison officials have assumed
power to censor complaints and to penalize prisoners for "slandering" prison
personnel and for other infringements incidental to complaints. 206 Another
persistent abuse is denial of the right of prisoners to receive food, which
creates a serious hunger and malnutrition problem .207 Finally, prisoners
are broadly entitled to medical care, 20 8 but even the best care available is
inadequate, and physicians themselves, if not simply incompetent, have




The penal practice of the Soviet Union is primarily governed under inter-
national law by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 210 In particular,
prison administrators who discriminate against prisoners for their religious,
political, or other opinions violate article 2(1). Prisoners who are subjected to
maltreatment and illegal forms of punishment are denied their rights under
article 7. The rights of prisoners to liberty and security of person also are not
respected under article 9(1), nor are they treated with humanity and respect
in accordance with article 10(1). It is also apparent that the conduct of prison
officials has been aimed at punishment of prisoners, rather than at rehabilita-
tion, as required by article 10(3). Finally, so long as arbitrary and abusive
206. Id.
207. Id. at 134-35. The Corrective Labour Code requires that prisoners receive nourishment
sufficient to function normally. The problem of obtaining adequate nourishment is intensified for
prisoners, who are usually assigned to hard labor. Food supplies are marginally adequate; in-
deed, samizdat reports indicate that the amount distributed may be below the legally required
scale and that the food is frequently inedible. The resulting undernourishment may damage the
prisoner's health and prevent him from completion of the work load requirement. This may lead
to a punitive lower diet and thereby create a very destructive cycle. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary,
supra note 189, at 135.
208. Corrective Labour Legislation, supra note L88, art. 37.
209. Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 135.
210. See note 26 supra. See also Rules supra note 98. Many obligations under the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights are also set forth as non-binding principles in the Rules. These and
others can be summarized as follows:
Rule 11: Adequate light and fresh air for living and working must be provided.
Rule 20: Adequate food to maintain health and strength must be provided.
Rule 22: Prisoners shall have medical services by qualified physicians.
Rule 30: No punishment is to be imposed except in accordance with law.
Rule 31: Corporal punishment is completely forbidden.
Rule 33: Instruments of restraint are prohibited except in certain circumstances for
maintaining order.
Rule 36: Prisoners have the right to make complaints without censorship or re-
prisal.
Rule 37: Prisoners have the right to communicate with the outside world.
Rule 40: All prisons are to have libraries stocked with recreational and instructional
books.
Rules 41 and 42: Free exercise of religion is guaranteed.
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treatment of prisoners continues, Soviet officials will have failed to respect
the right of individuals everywhere to be recognized as persons before the
law (article 16).
It scarcely needs mentioning that the effect of human rights violations in
Soviet penitentiary practice is to undermine the correctional and educational
purposes of corrective labor legislation in the U.S.S.R.211 Thus, there is a
weakening of legality within a crucial institution of the criminal justice sys-
tem. The Soviet government would be acting in its own interests by ensur-
ing that domestic laws and human rights obligations are rigorously observed
in its prisons.
CONCLUSION:
STRATEGIES TO IMPLEMENT HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Several proposals can be formulated to promote greater Soviet compliance
with the international human rights program. First of all, public protest
should intensify in order to focus world public opinion on human rights vio-
lations in the U.S.S.R. 212  Secondly, the West should openly support Soviet
jurists who defend dissidents and private citizens who speak out against
human rights violations, thereby strengthening the resolve of these, individu-
als to stand firmly in their claims. 213 This strategy will have even greater
effect if public figures intervene and lend their support. Thirdly, interna-
tional professional and governmental organizations should urge the U.S.S.R.
211. The rational organization of labor is essential for the correction and reeducation of con-
victs. In addition to these goals, corrective labor law fulfills the traditional function of punish-
ment for criminal acts. The legislative basis of corrective labor law is found in the CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 2, art. 14, which asserts that "'labour, free from exploitation" is essential to
"the growth of social wealth and of the well-being of the people," and art. 60, which states that
"every able-bodied" person has the duty "to work conscientiously" in a freely-chosen field of
"socially useful" work. Shupilov, supra note 188, at 179-80.
212. See Young-Anawaty, supra note 175, at 814; Pettiti, supra note 56, at 296. One example
of the positive effects of world public opinion occurred in 1961. Soviet legislation was enacted
for the prosecution of economic crimes. More than 200 Jews were sentenced to death and
executed under this statute. Although Jews made up only 1.2% of the population, 90% of those
executed were Jews. These executions ceased after public pressure was exerted through the
Untied Nations. Likewise, Jews were forbidden from baking unleavened bread (matzot) at Pass-
over by Khruschev, but this prohibition also ceased after protest at the U.N. Rosenne, Some
Legal Aspects of the Struggle for the Rights of Jews in the Soviet Union, 9 ISRAEL L. REV. 588,
589-90 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rosenne]. Another instance occurred when the Soviet Union
imposed a "diploma tax" on all Jewish graduates from institutions of higher learning in 1972.
The pressure of world public opinion forced it to abolish the tax within less than one year.
Dinstein, Science, Technology and Human Rights, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 155, 165 (1979). Finally,
Western nations expressed disapproval of the trials of Soviet citizens who monitored the
U.S.S.R.'s compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text
supra. Great Britain refused to move forward with a bilateral supporting agreement with the
Soviets, and the United States postponed the sale of oil and computer technology. Turack,
supra note 38, at 606 n.ll0.
213. See Feldbrugge, Penitentiary, supra note 189, at 136.
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to amend its domestic laws in a manner that would be compatible with
Soviet goals and yet safeguard the rights of ethnic minorities and dissidents.
The Soviet Union would thereby comply with its international obligations
and appear more credible to the world community. 214
The human rights movement is characterized by the gradual elevation of
the individual under international law from an object of the law to a sub-
ject. 215 Thus, fundamental human rights exist that transcend the principle
of national sovereignty. Through ratification of the major human rights
documents, the Soviet Union has in principle committed itself to participa-
tion in this process. The democratic nations of the world, aside from devot-
ing greater attention to protection of human rights in their own legal sys-
tems, should, as an expression of their shared values, continue to demand
that the Soviet Union recognize and protect the basic human rights of all
individuals subject to its law.
John T. Evrard
214. The binding nature of the international human rights instruments imposes a duty on the
co-signatories not only to fulfill their own obligations within their jurisdictions, but also to take a
legitimate interest in gaining respect for all common undertakings. The fact that a state under-
takes to maintain the human rights of its citizens does not justify derogation from fundamental
obligations under international law. Robertson, Helsinki, supra note 12, at 42. See also
Rosenne, supra note 212, at 589. See generally Signatures, supra note 12. But see Blishchenko,
supra note 12, at 820 (arguing that ratification of a treaty or convention should be treated as
domestic legislation enacted under the authority of the state as sovereign and therefore subject
to repeal). Other commentators respond that continued Soviet resistance to Western pressure to
comply with human rights norms is a breach of its obligations under international law. See
Hazard, Tactics, supra note 15, at 27-29. See also Hazard, The Future of Soviet Law, 8 SYDNEY
L. REV. 590, 597-98 (1979). The author states that "the Soviet law of the future will reflect a
new balance between freedom and restraint," but that the Soviet leadership will not accept the
obligations of the U.N. Covenants that they find to be incompatible with their policies. See
notes 26-30 supra,
215. See Higgins, Conceptual, supra note 9, at 13-14; van Dijk, supra note 9, at 1550.
